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Beyond the Witness: Bringing a Process
Perspective to Modem Evidence Law
Edward K. Cheng* and G. Alexander Nunn**
I. Introduction
For centuries, the foundation of the Anglo-American trial has been the
witness.' Witnesses report on their personal observations, provide opinions
of character, offer scientific explanations, and in the case of parties, narrate
their own story.2 Indeed, even for documentary and other physical evidence,
witnesses often provide the conduit through which such evidence reaches the
factfinder. Documentary or physical evidence rarely stands on its own.4
The law of evidence has thus unsurprisingly focused on-or perhaps
obsessed over-witnesses. The hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause
demand that declarants be available witnesses at trial so that they may be
subject to cross-examination.' Expert evidence rules emphasize an expert
witness's qualifications, bases, and methods.' Even the framework for
admitting photographs-evidence that is often self-explanatory-is witness-
centric. Trial practice commonly treats photographs as demonstrative
*Hess Chair in Law, Vanderbilt Law School.
**Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law; Ph.D. Student, Yale Law
School. We would like to thank Dwayne Betts, Danieli Evans, Thomas Kadri, Nancy King, Clare
Ryan, and participants at a Yale Law School Ph.D. Workshop and a Vanderbilt Law School Summer
Brown Bag Lunch for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to Natalie Pike for
excellent research assistance.
1. See generally George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 583-84
(1997) (discussing the importance of witnesses throughout history, beginning with
thirteenth-century English criminal trials).
2. For the modem evidentiary rules governing these forms of witness testimony, see FED. R.
EvID. 607-609, 701-704.
3. See FED. R. EvID. 803(18) (requiring an expert to read scientific articles to the jury rather
than allowing the article to stand on its own); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308-
09, 311, 329 (2009) (requiring lab technicians to testify about forensic lab results rather than
allowing the reports to stand on their own).
4. FED. R. EvID. 803(18); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311, 329 (holding exhibits and reports
are inadmissible unless the witness is subject to cross-examination); see also Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647,659 (2011) (requiring the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst producing
evidence before a report is admissible).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3; FED. R. EvID. 801-802; see Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,
358 (2011) ("[T]he basic objective of the Confrontation Clause ... is to prevent the accused from
being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant . . . ."); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 821-22 (2006) (distinguishing between statements that are nontestimonial and not subject
to the Confrontation Clause, and statements that are testimonial and subject to the Confrontation
Clause).
6. FED. R. EvID. 702-704.
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evidence, reducing them to a mere illustration of the vouching witness's
testimony.7
Our contention is that this witness-centered perspective is antiquated
and counterproductive. It is a deeply limited and ultimately distortive lens
through which the legal system views the evidence available in the modem
world. Historically, focusing on individual witnesses may have made sense.
In a world without mechanization, industrial processes, and corporate
policies, individuals made observations, took actions, and made decisions on
a case-by-case, subjective basis.' Calling those persons to testify in court was
then a natural way of clarifying and testing those individualized observations,
actions, or decisions.' For example, if the issue was whether a furniture maker
was negligent in constructing a chair, the plaintiff might call the artisan. The
artisan would testify about his craftsmanship, his suppliers and materials, and
his various design choices. Although an artisan's choices perhaps became
routinized over time, those decisions were specific to him, often subjective,
and unlikely to be memorialized elsewhere. The person's testimony was
therefore a critical way of gauging whether he acted properly.' 0
In the modem world, particularly in commercial and technological
contexts, systems and processes have replaced individual judgment." Some
processes are entirely computerized or mechanical.' 2 Others involve human
activity so regularized that the process itself is far more important to
reliability than the specific human actor.13 In this latter case, the person is
7. FED. R. EVID. 1002; see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic
Evidence and the Power ofAnalogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 73 (1998).
8. See generally JOHN LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ANGLO-AMERiCAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 297-98, 366, 376-77 (2009) (describing eighteenth-
century English Chancery's testimony practices, which focused on individual answers and accounts
and saw the acceptance of cross-examination by lawyers).
9. John H. Wigmore, A General Survey ofthe History ofthe Rules ofEvidence ("By the 1500s,
the constant employment of witnesses, as the jury's chief source of information, brings about a
radical change. Here enter, very directly, the possibilities of our modem system."), in 2 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 691, 692 (1908); see also John Langbein, The
Historical Foundations ofthe Law ofEvidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLuM. L. REV.
1168, 1169-72 (1996) (discussing the development of the law of evidence around the necessity of
providing jurors accurate oral testimony).
10. See Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition ofthe Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical
Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 91, 96 (1981) (describing cross-examination as "the most perfect and effectual
system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of mortals").
11. See generally Andrew L. Russell, Standardization in History: A Review Essay with an Eye
to the Future (discussing the standardization of international processes), in THE STANDARDS EDGE:
FUTURE GENERATIONS 247-60 (Sherrie Bolin ed., 2005); THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION (Panagiotis Delimatsis ed., 2015) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION].
12. For instance, photographic evidence constitutes an entirely mechanical form of process-
based evidence. See infra subpart E(C).
13. Consider, here, a forensic lab technician overseeing a DNA test. Although the technician
[Vol. 97:10771078
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reduced to a cog who exercises limited, if any, independent judgment. In
these instances involving systems and processes, the focus of the legal system
should no longer be on individuals and their testimony. After all, the
reliability inquiry itself no longer depends on their actions or observations.
Revisiting the defective chair example illustrates the point. The safety
of chairs emerging from a mass production line is no longer about the
individual line workers. To be sure, for any given chair, an individual line
worker may be inattentive or otherwise negligent. But there are too many
chairs and too many line workers, so modem practice treats the entire system
as a single entity. The focus is on the reliability of the design and
manufacturing process as a whole, the quality control checks, and other
company policies and practices.' 4 Any individual witnesses are beside the
point. Yes, one could call an employee to testify about the policies, but the
key evidence is the policies themselves, not the employee's testimony.
Whereas the policies and quality controls reveal important details about the
appropriateness of the company's manufacturing process, the employee is
only important if there exist questions about the employee's individual
conduct, which seldom is the inquiry."
Such process-based evidence needs a process-based evidentiary
framework, but the legal system has largely jammed process-based evidence
into the traditional witness-based scheme with poor results. The traditional
framework hampers the use of process evidence, distorts its presentation, and
fails to ensure its reliability. For example, the pictorial testimony theory of
photographs,16 the Confrontation Clause rejection of certified lab results
must prepare a sample for testing, the probative force of DNA evidence-particularly a DNA
match-stems from an objective, nonpersonal process known as DNA typing that removes human
subjectivity altogether. 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 30:2 (2018)
(providing an introduction to DNA terminology and taxonomy of typing systems); see also infra
subpart m(A).
14. The focus of lawsuits alleging a manufacturing defect, for example, often centers on
problems arising from standardized production lines rather than the subjective actions of any one
individual. See JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 278-79 (1986) (detailing how processes
provided a needed response to a crisis of control that stemmed from the significant rise of production
capabilities in the nineteenth century); David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV.
851, 865-82 (2002) (discussing the development of doctrines that allow for product liability
resulting from deviations from the intended design, even where all possible care was taken in
production).
15. See Owen, supra note 14, at 875-78 (exploring the application of the malfunction doctrine
in various manufacturing defect cases, none of which considered employee conduct as central to the
case).
16. See FED. R. EVID. 1002 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules (discussing the
practice of having a witness use a picture to illustrate testimony); Mnookin, supra note 7, at 73




under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts," and the learned treatise exception
to the hearsay rule" are arguably all anomalies caused by the law's traditional
focus on witnesses. Some doctrines, notably the business records exception
to the hearsay rule, have shown a great awareness of the importance of
processes. 9 But they are the exception, and they are merely temporary fixes
to the fundamental tension between process-based and witness-based
evidence.
The witness focus of traditional evidence rules leaves the legal system
ill-equipped to handle process evidence, and this deficiency engenders
considerable costs. Process evidence is not only widespread in today's world,
but it is often also highly probative.20 Yet the witness-based evidence rules
impede the admission of this process evidence, and they do not ensure its
reliability.
The goal of this Article is therefore not to propose discrete patches like
the business records exception. The goal instead is to create an appropriate
framework for testing and challenging process evidence comparable to the
one we have for witnesses. Such a structure requires both analogical and
creative thinking. For example, cross-examination may be the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" with regard to witnesses,2 1
but it is a poor instrument for probing processes. A process framework may
therefore require broadening our conception of confrontation or rethinking
what constitutes hearsay. Rather than compulsory process and cross-
examination, process evidence may instead require enhanced discovery rules
facilitating access to and testing of the process.22 Ultimately, our legal system
17. 557 U.S. 305, 308, 329 (2009).
18. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
19. FED. R. EviD. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. The Notes expound:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously to be supplied
by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision,
by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate
record as part of a continuing job or occupation.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing
Controversy over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97,
97-102 (2016) (discussing the proliferation of automated forensic techniques and arguing that
defendants should have the right to test the source code of programs that match genetic information);
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2000-22 (2017) (examining "which
machine acts and utterances implicate credibility, and how courts have attempted to regulate them").
21. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1367, at 32 (4th ed. 1974); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116,
124 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 128-30 (proposing a discovery regime that
balances machine access with protection of trade secrets by allowing for testing of the program
before source code disclosure); Roth, supra note 20, at 2027-30 (considering and proposing
potential ways in which jurisdictions might approach pretrial disclosure and access to the source
code for machine evidence).
1080 [Vol. 97:1077
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demands a means of assessing the reliability of process-based evidence that
does not rely on the persistent fiction that process reliability is fully
assessable from the witness stand alone.
The Article proceeds as follows. After this Introduction, Part II begins
with the witness fixation that pervades the modem courtroom. Regardless of
the nature of the evidence at issue-be it eyewitness testimony, documentary
evidence, or forensic lab results-the overwhelming trend in courtrooms
today is for parties to examine evidence indirectly through a surrogate
witness.23 Witnesses serve as conduits through which the reliability of almost
all evidence is assessed.24 As noted, this witness-centric adjudicatory regime
may have made historical sense. The reliability of evidence was, for
centuries, inextricably intertwined with human observation, action, and
subjectivity. Early cases often turned entirely on the testimony of
eyewitnesses, and while physical evidence did play a role at trial, its
reliability often depended on an artisan's skill.25 In a world driven by
subjective, ad hoc actions, centering trial practice and procedure around the
witness stand was the natural choice.2 6
However, the emergence of standardization marked the beginning of the
end for an era focused exclusively on so-called person-based evidence.2 7 In
recent decades, evidentiary reliability has become increasingly dependent not
on the subjective observation or skill of particular individuals but instead on
23. See Nicholas Klaiber, Note, Confronting Reality: Surrogate Forensic Science Witnesses
Under the Confrontation Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 199, 228 (2011) (discussing recent changes in
forensic laboratory protocol enabling surrogate witnesses to fully testify as to forensic methods,
results, and analysis).
24. See generally Fisher, supra note 1, at 624-56 (recounting the historical development and
legal treatment of witness credibility conflicts); Langbein, supra note 9, at 1169-72 (examining the
development of the law of evidence and the role of witnesses for introducing the jury to relevant
facts of the trial).
25. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 34-35, 48-49 (providing examples of thirteenth-
century cases centering on the importance of the influence of eyewitness testimony and its
consistency); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort
Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1131 (1990) (pointing to the relevance of a carpenter-defendant's skill
in pre-eighteenth century negligence cases).
26. See generally Fisher, supra note 1, at 602-24 (recounting the development ofjury trials and
the usage of witnesses in early English law and providing specific instances where witnesses
testified to subjective experiences); Langbein, supra note 9, at 1169-72 (describing the development
of the instructional jury, whereby witnesses would inform the jurors of relevant facts).
27. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 97-98 (contrasting modem automated forensic
procedures against early twentieth-century individual inspections); Roth, supra note 20, at 2009-20
(describing the development of standardized evidence, beginning with basic scientific instruments
and progressing to biometric machinery). See also generally INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION,
supra note 11, at 1 (compiling articles discussing the foundations of international standard-setting);
Russell, supra note 11, at 247-56 (discussing recent academic works on standardization in politics,
business, economics, science, technology, labor, and culture, and speculating on the impact of
globalization and convergence on possible future trends in international standardization).
2019] 1081
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standardized and often objective and mechanical processes that largely
eliminate human subjectivity. 2 8
Part III demonstrates how our person-based adjudicatory regime has
hereto failed to appropriately respond to the rise of process-based evidence.
Rather than attempting to scrutinize process-based evidence on its own terms,
modem evidentiary rules governing process-based evidence rely on uneasy
fictions to try to test its reliability from the witness stand. Essentially,
process-based evidence is crammed into the entrenched person-based system.
As Part III will detail, this type mismatch has led to significant missteps in
the evidentiary treatment of forensic lab results, photographs, scientific
articles, and business records.
Part IV, therefore, proposes a new conceptual approach for handling
process-based evidence, recasting the traditional witness-based ideas of
appearance, cross-examination, and credibility into the process-based
context. As a baseline matter, Part IV argues in favor of expanding the
compulsory process and subpoena powers to allow litigants increased access
to the underlying processes generating evidence in particular cases, thereby
enabling them to assess the reliability of the evidence directly rather than
through a surrogate witness. Complementing this reform is a proposed
reconceptualization of the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rule that would
tailor these doctrines to the specific contours of process-based evidence while
staying true to their worthwhile normative aims. Having settled the
preliminaries, Part IV then addresses the overarching, pressing question: If
the reliability of process-based evidence is not assessed through the witness
stand, how is it to be measured instead?
Finally, Part V concludes the discussion, asking whether acknowledging
the process shift fundamentally changes the nature of trial. For example, will
greater acceptance of process evidence lead to a more documentary-based
trial process, as opposed to the traditional witness-based one? Will it destroy
the celebrated narrative structure of trial? And will it lead to less
individualized justice?
28. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 98 (stating that 85% of DNA laboratories use automated
forensic-analysis techniques because the computerization results in uniform analysis); Roth, supra
note 20, at 2044 (quoting Justice Liu's dissenting opinion in People v. Lopez that contrasts the use
of standard methods to measure blood-alcohol levels against "less accurate or more subjective




A. The Rise of the Witness
The witness is the focal point of the modern trial.29 In determining guilt
or innocence, liability or the absence thereof, factfinders often turn to the
witness-box to receive and weigh information from knowledgeable persons.
Did a defendant possess the requisite mens rea for a particular crime? Did a
tort victim's own actions contribute to her injury? Witnesses usually provide
the answer.
Witnesses relay eyewitness accounts of the events in question, providing
factfinders pertinent, firsthand information.30 They offer opinions about
character-claims that an individual is trustworthy or dishonest, aggressive
or peaceful." They impart expert knowledge to factfinders, distilling
complex topics down to a more palatable form.3 2 And, in many cases, they
are the conduit through which certain forms of admissible hearsay enter the
courtroom, informing factfmders of a third party's excited utterance or dying
declaration."
But despite the witness's prominence in criminal and civil adjudication,
it is important to recognize that our witness fixation is generally not the
product of modern planning and deliberation. That is, adjudication via the
witness-box does not. enjoy mainstream acceptance because of a modern
belief that, relative to its alternatives, witness testimony is the best means of
29. See generally Fisher, supra note 1, at 602-24 (chronicling the rise of defense witnesses).
Sir William Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale also spoke highly of the witness-focus of pre-modern
trials. See Raymond LaMagna, (Re)constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining Unavailability
and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1526-27 (2006). Hale, for example,
wrote, "[T]he very Manner of a Witness's delivering his Testimony will give a probable Indication
whether he speaks truly or falsely ..... Id. at 1526 (quoting MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 252 (1713)).
30. Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy ofEyewitness Testimony in a Criminal
Case, 42 CONN. L. REv. 435, 441 (2009) (noting that eyewitness testimony "is one of the most
powerful types of evidence that can be presented against a criminal defendant"); see also Matthew
J. Reedy, Witnessing the Witness: The Case for Exclusion of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 86
NOTREDAME L. REv. 905,906 (2011) (providing an example of eyewitness testimony being given).
31. See FED. R. EvID. 607-608 (allowing witnesses to question another witness's credibility or
character).
32. See FED. R. EvID. 702-704 (providing for expert witness testimony and allowing for
potentially inadmissible facts where their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect); see
also Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or
Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131, 1137-42 (1993) (discussing the tension between two
conceptions of the role of expert witness testimony: deference and education).
33. See FED. R. EvID. 803-804 (listing exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
2019] 1083
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exploring all evidentiary issues at trial. Rather, the witness-box continues to
occupy a preeminent place at trial because it is a product of history.3 4
A brief examination of the roots of witness testimony helps explain its
entrenchment today. In its earliest form, the jury's role was largely
unrecognizable as compared to its modem function. At the turn of the twelfth
century, the English legal system was in desperate need of a viable dispute-
resolution tool. The legitimacy of the infamous ordeal was in rapid decline,
and a process known as "appeal of felony," essentially trial by combat, was
highly unpopular for obvious reasons.3 5 Thus, in 1166, Henry H issued the
Assize of Clarendon, which established the first formalized witness-jury
system.3 6 The early jury was a self-informed group, as jurors' place in tight-
knit agrarian communities enabled them to have intimate knowledge about
relevant trial facts or, at a minimum, put jurors in the best position to uncover
the necessary facts. 7 Rather than assuming a passive, evaluative role, the
early jury was expected to have pretrial knowledge of the events at issue and
come "upon oath" to trials to speak as to whether anyone in their area was
"accused" or "notoriously suspect[ed]" of certain serious offenses-
including murder, robbery, theft, or harboring." Essentially, then, the first
form of witness testimony was offered by the jury itself. Even at the
inception point of jury-based adjudication, procedure centered around the
testimony of knowledgeable individuals.
In the centuries that followed, social change necessitated a radical
reinvention of this early model. The Black Death saw open-fields agriculture,
the essential predicate for the self-informing jury, become nonviable as
drastic reductions in population size forced workers to embrace independent,
enclosure-based farming. 9 Communal life faded away and with it the
34. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 585-602 (chronicling the history of the jury trial and noting that
"[b]y the middle of the fifteenth century ... the English trial system had come to stake great
importance on the evidence of witnesses sworn under oath").
35. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 28-35 (discussing appeal of felony and its
shortcomings).
36. As will be discussed in full above, the early jury was often comprised of firsthand witnesses
to the event in question. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, at 440-43 (David C.
Douglas & George W. Greenaway eds., 2d ed. 1981); LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 35-37.
37. Langbein, supra note 9, at 1170-71.
38. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, supra note 36, at 440-41.
39. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 224-27. Although the Black Death spurred on the first
stages of the era of non-juror witnesses, remnants of the jury's previous self-informing witness
function remained. For example, in 1598, the Queen's Bench refused to overturn a nisi prius jury
verdict, even after one of the jurors produced evidence not admitted at trial and "shewed it to inform
himself and his fellows." Graves v. Short (1598) 78 Eng. Rep. 857, Cro. Eliz. 616 (QB); LANGBEIN
ET AL., supra note 8, at 245. Nonetheless, the rise of the non-juror witness is marked by a number
of key factors. First, Anthony Musson identified the transition to an instructional rather than pre-
informed jury by noting the rise of unsworn statements (both by the defendant and witnesses) in the
courtroom during the fourteenth century. See ANTHONY MUSSON, PUBLIC ORDER AND LAW
[Vol. 97:10771084
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Crown's ability to tap into local knowledge. The original witness-jury was
in danger of extinction, as "[w]ithout the village, the jury, as contemporaries
knew it, would have been impossible."40 Yet, despite radical socioeconomic
changes--changes that caused the jury's initial proactive, self-informing
witness function to gradually transition into passive, evaluative
responsibilities-the witness stand did not become obsolete.4 1 Instead, trials
centered around non-juror, third-party witnesses became increasingly
common.
Sir Thomas Smith's De Republica Anglorum provides an example of the
emerging witness-centric trial.42 Smith's sixteenth-century account, the
"earliest window we have on the early modem trial,'3 depicts a victim and
accusing witnesses engaging with a defendant in an adversarial dialogue
about the circumstances of an assault."' No physical evidence is presented.
No experts offer opinions. No lawyers make arguments to the jury. Instead,
Smith depicts a courtroom in which the jury is simply to adjudicate guilt on
the basis of the testimonial exchange between third-party witnesses and the
defendant.4 5 The trial begins with the victim speaking to the defendant under
oath that "thou robbest me in such a place, thou beatest me[], thou tookest
my horse from me[], and my purse...."4 The victim's testimony is
followed by that of other accusing witnesses who provide, under oath,
testimonial "evidence against the malefactor."47 The defendant then
responds, denying the charges and demonstrating that the "accused's merged
ENFORCEMENT: THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1294-1350, at 201-)5 (1996)
("In the early fourteenth century, . . . the self-informing character of trial juries was tempered by the
recognition that witnesses ... were an acceptable and sometimes essential part of medieval criminal
trials."). Third-party witness statements also marked the rise of the ignorant jury, as it constituted a
significant departure from the trials with self-informing juries in which, as noted by Daniel Klerman,
third-party "testimony was quite uncommon." Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 142 (2003). Second, as Langbein notes, the vicinage requirement that jurors
be composed of individuals from specific hundreds steadily declined. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra
note 8, at 243-44. The purpose of the vicinage requirement was to ensure that a jury constituted of
self-informed witnesses give their proximity to the crime and parties; the removal of the
requirement, therefore, signaled a transition into a new era in which an ignorant jury would need to
be informed of the details of a case via others on the witness stand.
40. R.B. Goheen, Peasant Politics? Village Community and the Crown in Fifteenth-Century
England, 96 AM. HIST. REV. 42, 53 (1991).
41. See LANGBEIN, supra note 8, at 238-48 (describing the development of jury-informing
practices and compulsory process, which maintained the relevancy of the witness).
42. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 112-14 (Mary Dewar ed., 1982); accord
JOIN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 13 (2003).
43. LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 13.
44. Id. at 13-16.
45. Id. at 13-14.
46. SMITH, supra note 42, at 114; accord LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 13.
47. SMITH, supra note 42, at 114; accord LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 13.
2019] 1085
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roles as defender and witness were inextricable."48 After all the witnesses
provided their accounts, the jury dispensed justice purely on the basis of the
oral exchange they had observed. As John Langbein puts it, the jury was told
to "decide the case based on what they had learned from the exchange,
usually with little instruction." 9 In-court testimony was both necessary and
sufficient for a conviction.
As time marched on, the focus on the witness in the courtroom evolved
from practical necessity to central obsession. Much of this was due to a sort
of institutional path dependency. As witnesses became a mainstay of
adjudication, rules and practices naturally emerged to encourage the
production and scrutiny of their testimony.5 o The Marian Committal Statute
of 1555 was the first decree to afford justices of the peace (effectively,
prosecutors) compulsory process, granting them the authority to require that
accusing witnesses attend a proceeding to proffer testimony." John Henry
Wigmore asserted that there existed "by the beginning of the 1700s, a general
and settled acceptance of [the hearsay exclusionary] rule as a fundamental
part of the law." 52 Forced into the courtroom by compulsory process or the
hearsay rule, witnesses found their testimony subject to an increasingly
robust set of procedures designed to test the weight of their words. The oath,
of course, sought to ensure witness veracity by relying on the threat of divine
retribution. Cross-examination emerged as "the most perfect and effectual
system for the unraveling of falsehood ever devised by the ingenuity of
mortals."53 In Jeremy Bentham's words: "Against erroneous or mendacious
testimony, the grand security is cross-examination. . . ."54 As these practices
and procedures became normalized and refined over time, the prospect of
adjudication without an emphasis on the witness-box gradually faded. 5
48. LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 42, at 13.
49. Id. at 14.
50. See generally LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 559-728 (exploring the shift of sixteenth-
century trial practices forbidding defense witnesses to an adversarial system allowing for witnesses
and cross-examination as a result of legislation as well as improvements in investigation procedure);
Fisher, supra note 1, at 624-55 (outlining procedural developments that guided juries in witness-
centric trials).
51. LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 51; John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law
Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 82, 91 (HelImbolz et al. eds., 1997).
52. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 25 (2d ed. 1923).
53. Bodansky, supra note 10, at 96 (citing Of the Disqualification ofParties as Witnesses, 5
AM. L. REG. 257, 263-64 (1857)).
54. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE SPECIALLY APPLIED TO
ENGLISH PRACTICE 212 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1955) (1827).
55. Institutional entrenchment is not a phenomenon isolated to witness-centric trials. The
primary competitor to modem trials is of course plea bargaining, a practice that itself has undergone
a similar entrenchment process in our juridical system over the past century. See generally
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Instead, an entire trial system built upon the assumption that witnesses would
relay evidence into the courtroom increasingly demanded just that.
Of course, in this early era, establishing the witness as the focal point of
trial practice and procedure was entirely sensible. Documentary, forensic,
and even physical evidence were in relatively short supply.56 Instead, almost
all evidence was "person-based." As demonstrated by De Republica
Anglorum, cases often turned entirely on the weighing of competing witness
testimony or evidence that was at least the product of ad hoc, subjective
human actions.57 Because the reliability of evidence was primarily dependent
on the particular person who brought information to the court's attention, it
was a natural and necessary approach for the Anglo-American legal system
to funnel scrutiny of evidence through the witness-box. Yet as the following
sections will show, this traditional system failed to anticipate the rise of non-
person-based evidence." By the time the pre-industrial era came to an end, a
mere preference for trial-by-witness in the Anglo-American legal system had
become a mandate, rendering the system ill-equipped to respond to a new era
of evidence.
B. The Rise ofProcess
Socioeconomic conditions have drastically changed since the time when
witness-centric adjudication arose as the primary means of determining
cases. Whereas the witness-focused trial emerged in an era when individuals
made observations, took actions, and made decisions on an ad hoc, subjective
basis, modem society is instead characterized by a phenomenon overlooked
by the early designers of the Anglo-American trial system-
standardization."
Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006) (arguing that the prevalence of and institutional preference for
resolving criminal proceedings through plea bargains constitute institutional entrenchment).
56. See generally LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 51 (discussing the development of
"rational means of proof' based on "evidence from witnesses, the analysis of [circumstantial
evidence], and the inspection of written documents" (alteration in original)).
57. SMITH, supra note 42, at 114; LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 14.
58. See generally Fisher, supra note 1, at 585-602 (detailing how juries' significant power was
supported through a quasi-divine belief in the power of a witness's oath).
59. See generally INTERNATIONAL STANDARDISATION, supra note 11 (compiling scholarship
examining the "complex phenomena that lead to the creation of technical standards," "institutional
structures," and "decision-making processes"); Russell, supra note 11, at 247-60 (providing a
survey of standardization in various areas and tracing the development from nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century advancements). Machine learning presents an ideal illustration of how the rise of
mechanization is beginning to dominate spheres traditionally considered the exclusive domain of
humans. John 0. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence
Will Transform the Role ofLawyers in the Delivery ofLegal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041,
3043-46 (2014); see also generally BENIGER, supra note 14, at 254-398 (detailing how processes
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The inception of standardization is found in the Industrial Revolution.60
Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution upended
economies by rejecting individualistic artisan skill in favor of replicable
processes. 6 1 Assembly lines systematically piecing together parts replaced
workshops crafting items holistically; strict adherence to guidelines started
to displace individual judgment and discretion. Ultimately, the "Industrial
Revolution augmented and replaced human effort by machines in
manufacturing, farming, and transportation."62 Consider, for example, the
transformation of the textile industry. In the pre-industrial world, the quality
of an article of clothing was largely dependent on the skill of the worker who
made it.63 The finest materials would go to waste if a worker lacked the
necessary skill to craft a garment.' The Industrial Revolution, however,
standardized clothing production. Mechanical innovation made the quality of
cloth dependent on the attributes of a particular machine rather than on the
skill of a worker.6 5
Standardization has grown into a staple of modem society. Today,
computers deliver information according to their internal code.66 Cameras
produce high-definition digital images mechanistically.6 7 No longer is human
skill required to complete complex tasks, as standardized procedures are now
invoked to land large aircraft, perform certain surgeries, and optimize
logistical networks." Interactions among humans are also becoming
provided a needed response to a crisis of control that stemmed from the significant rise of production
capabilities in the nineteenth century).
60. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen & Yoram Barzel, The Evolution of Criminal Law and Police
During the Pre-modern Era, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 540, 542-43 (2011) ("The Industrial Revolution
began to change the degree to which variability interfered in life. For the first time it became
possible to leave nature outside the production process ... variability was reduced enough to allow
sufficient measurement and reliable replication at a reasonable cost, that is, the beginning of
standardization.").
61. See id. at 542-43, 546-47 (analyzing how the proliferation of standardized transportation
enabled the proliferation of manufactured goods over artisan productions).
62. Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions Be Patentable?, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYsIS 265, 313 (2011).
63. See THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF WESTERN TEXTILES 1-2, 4 (David Jenkins ed., 2003).
64. See id. at 1-4 (describing various types of traditional and experimental materials while
noting that early textiles were "homespun" and "homemade").
65. See id. at 4-6 (noting the diversity of materials and textiles developed by later
industrializing countries' textile industries).
66. VAKUL SHARMA, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: LAW AND PRACTICE 168 (3d ed. 2011).
67. ELIZABETH ALLEN & SOPHIE TRIANTAPHILIDOU, THE MANUAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY 1-2
(2009).
68. See Roth, supra note 20, at 2003 (providing examples of complex tasks completed by
mechanical procedures); see also Richard M. Satava, Emerging Technologies for Surgery in the
21st Century, 134 ARCH SURG 1197, 1197-1202 (1999) (detailing the technological advancements
in surgery); Future Technology and Airplane Types, STANFORD (2015), http://adg.stanford.edu/
aa241/intro/futureac.html [https://perma.cc/34HX-74FH] (highlighting the technological
sophistication ofmodern airplanes); Adam Robinson, The Future ofLogistics: Are 3PL Companies
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increasingly standardized. College admissions are no longer primarily
dependent on a particular committee's subjective decisions but instead on a
rubric of set factors aimed at ensuring a capable and diverse student body.69
Many business decisions-say, the termination of a corporate employee for
substance abuse-are usually settled not by a supervisor's whim but instead
by a pre-determined policy applicable to all employees.70
The social change brought on by standardization has had a profound
effect on the types of evidence introduced in modem courtrooms. Namely,
standardization has caused the emergence of a new category of evidence best
described as "process-based." Process-based evidence arises from a system,
allowing us to inquire into its reliability through a general, rather than
specific, inquiry. Indeed, the reliability of process-based evidence depends
far more on a standardized procedure than it does on any particular person.n
For example, taking the De Republica Anglorum account into the twenty-first
century, if there had been a video camera at the scene of the assault described
by Sir Thomas Smith, our confidence in the video footage would come from
our background knowledge of video cameras rather than any particular
person.72 We know that video cameras typically record scenes mechanically
and accurately, and absent extraordinary circumstances, we are likely to
believe their content regardless of who set up or maintained the camera or
who offers the video in court.73 Whereas the person-based testimony offered
in Smith's original account involved evidence both observed and related by
an individual, the process-based video example involves process-based
evidence observed by and ultimately related by machines.74 Figure 1 lists
some of the attributes that characterize the person-process distinction.
Ready to Adopt These 4 Emerging Technologies?, CERASIS (Jan. 14,2015), http://cerasis.com/2015/
01/14/future-of-logistics/ [https://perma.cc/TXX8-7K6A] (reviewing key technological advances in
logistics).
69. See, e.g., WARREN W. WILLINGHAM & HUNTER M. BRELAND, PERSONAL QUALITIES AND
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 2-3, 19 (1982) (explaining the increased emphasis placed on personal
qualities in college admissions).
70. JOHN P. HOFFMANN ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF WORKER DRUG USE AND WORKPLACE
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 1 (1997) (evaluating "the presence of written policies and employee
assistance programs for workers with alcohol or drug problems").
71. See generally MARVIN RAUSAND & ARNLiOT HOYLAND, SYSTEM RELIABILITY THEORY:
MODELS, STATISTICAL METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2004) (discussing conceptual
approaches for testing the reliability of various forms of standardized systems).
72. Cf SMITH, supra note 42, at 114. Recall that, in Thomas Smith's original account discussed
above, the plaintiff and a series of accusing witnesses alleged that the defendant had beaten and
robbed the plaintiff. In the original version, the trial constituted nothing more than a series of
testimonial exchanges among the witnesses.
73. See Jordan S. Gruber et al., Video Technology, 58 AM. JUR. TRIALS 481, 502 (1996) ("In
addition to being pervasive, video technology and television is extremely persuasive.").
74. Id. at 500 (describing the video playback process as involving "the transmission of visual
images of moving and stationary objects, generally with accompanying sound, as electromagnetic
waves, and the reconversion of those received waves into reliable representations of the original
visual images and accompanying sound").
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Eyewitnesses, testimony, and video recordings serve as convenient
examples for contrasting person-based and process-based evidence. In some
instances, however, a piece of evidence might possess both person and
process elements. Where this occurs, the proper classification of a piece of
evidence depends on whether the value of the evidence is contingent on our
assessment of a specific, individual person and her personal qualities, or
whether the value stems from the generic quality of the process.
For example, consider a business record, such as a sales receipt, offered
to show that the defendant purchased certain items from a store.76 The sales
process involves a human actor-the sales clerk entering or scanning item
numbers-but the source of the reliability comes from the standardized
process, not the specific individual. 77 We trust the sales receipt because the
store produces these receipts as a matter of course, and it is that standardized
process that deserves our scrutiny rather than the specific clerk.7 ' The clerk,
75. As we will discuss below, forensic lab results, business records, and some learned treatises
(such as scientific articles) all constitute examples of process-based evidence, despite the
involvement of human actors. The individuals involved in the production of this evidence are not
exercising subjective discretion or engaging in ad hoc actions but instead simply accomplishing
preset, standardized tasks. See infra Part III.
76. For background on the operation of systems that generate and store business records, see
generally David Bearman, Record-Keeping Systems, 36 ARCHIVARIA 16 (1993).
77. See id. at 31 (describing the functional requirements of a record-keeping system, which sees
reliability as stemming from the objective controls employed by a system rather than the subjective
actions of a document's creator).
78. Id. ("Records must have been created and maintained in the normal course of business, and
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absent some extraordinary circumstance, is interchangeable with any other
and for our assessment purposes, nothing but a cog in the process. Thus, the
mere presence of a person in the production of the evidence does not
necessarily mean that evidence is person-based.
Similarly, the mere involvement of a machine does not automatically
mean that the evidence is process-based. For example, suppose a person takes
a series of photographs to show how a structure deteriorated over time.
Photographs of course involve the mechanical or electronic operation of a
camera." Assessing whether the camera's photographs are an accurate
representation of the scene is thus a process-based question. However,
whether the pictures were in fact taken at the time intervals claimed depends
on the truthfulness and reliability of the photographer. This latter inquiry
would be person-based.
Sensible methods for testing and verifying person-based evidence are
not the same as those for process-based evidence. Because person-based
evidence is dependent on the reliability of the source, traditional witness-
focused methods of proof are the most natural option.s0 The person
responsible for the evidence-whether because the person is the eyewitness
to the event or the source of expertise-should appear in court, give
testimony, and be subject to cross-examination.81
Critical evaluation of process-based evidence is sharply different.
Because the source of reliability arises from the process, the court needs
information on that process, which may or may not come from a witness. We
could learn about the operation of a video camera via an engineering expert
from a leading manufacturer, but it may be far more convenient (and
comprehensive) to learn about video cameras from a book. We could learn
about a bank deposit from the teller who accepted it, but it may be more
reliable to look at the computer database that recorded the transaction.
Alternatives to witnesses-documents, electronic databases, and the
like-are by no means second-best in the process-based context. Indeed,
those alternatives will often be more sensible, efficient, and reliable than their
witness-based counterparts. The engineering expert is unlikely to have the
same breadth of knowledge and expertise as the author(s) of the book.82 The
documented procedures that were followed should conform to common practices in the industry.").
79. ALLEN & TRIANTAPHILIDOU, supra note 67, at 2-3.
80. As discussed above, for traditional person-based evidence, the witness stand is the natural
crucible through which evidentiary evaluation should run as it subjects the testifying individual to
the oath, cross-examination, and direct observation by the jury. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 378 (3d
ed. 2013).
8 1. See id.
82. Moreover, adversarial experts can sometimes play an obfuscating, rather than clarifying,
role. Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in
the Battle ofExperts, 106 Nw. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (2012) ("The adversarial presentation of expert
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bank teller is highly unlikely to remember a routine deposit transaction. In
some cases, the live witness will be preferable-for example, if the case
involves some specific aspect of the video camera not found in the book or
something unusual happened during the bank transaction. But in most cases,
the process-based evidence is more objective and transparent and less prone
to bias than the person. Ultimately, in the process-based context, witnesses
are far from the be-all and end-all.
III. Person-Focus and Its Evidentiary Consequences
The American trial system has hereto failed to effectively adapt to the
rise of standardization and the emergence of process-based evidence in
courtrooms. As explored above, traditional evidence law envisions trials in
which almost every piece of evidence has a significant human connection,
and in which evidentiary weight is intrinsically intertwined with witness
reliability. The outcome of trials and the drama of the courtroom hinges on
the performance of witnesses-their narratives, their credibility, and their
ability to withstand cross-examination." Indeed, trials are nothing but a
series of witnesses-a trial without witnesses is not only unthinkable but
arguably not a trial at all.84
The evidentiary rules demonstrate this focus on witnesses." The
Hearsay Rule strongly preferences having live witnesses--ones who can
swear oaths, exhibit their nervousness on the stand, and be potentially torn
apart on cross-examination.86 The expert evidence rules, contained in FRE
702-704, contemplate expert witnesses (as opposed to books or articles)
being the primary conduit for specialized information. 7 And then there is the
Confrontation Clause," which, as currently interpreted, emphatically
requires that accusatory evidence in criminal cases be presented by a live
witness.89
evidence can exaggerate the importance of a minority view on a scientific question."); see also
David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert
Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REv. 451, 453-55 (2008) (positing that modem rules for expert testimony
can lead to "adversarial bias"); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 1113, 1130
(1991) (explaining that litigation can often devolve into "courtroom battles between experts," which
leads to "unnecessary, excessive confusion").
83. See supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
84. See SMITH, supra note 42, at 110-16 (depicting an early sixteenth-century trial as nothing
more than a testimonial exchange between witnesses).
85. Langbein, supra note 9, at 1171-72.
86. FED. R. EviD. 801(c), 802 (barring from the courtroom statements which "the declarant
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing" and "a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement").
87. FED. R. EvID. 702-704.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3.
89. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821- 22
(2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
1092 [Vol. 97:1077
Beyond the Witness
Yet given the rise of standardization and process-based evidence, the
overwhelming preoccupation on witnesses makes little sense. In many
instances, witnesses are no longer the chief source of information for legal
decision-making, both empirically and normatively. Instead, reliability is
dependent on a broader system, a series of processes in which human
involvement is either nonexistent or routinized to the point that case-by-case
subjectivity (the necessary predicate for worthwhile witness testimony) is
eliminated.
What has emerged, therefore, is a type mismatch. Given the absence of
a process-based framework for scrutinizing process-based evidence, our legal
system has resorted to evaluating process-based evidence with the only
toolset available to it: witness-centric countermeasures. In the subparts
below, we will detail key areas in which the person-based treatment of
process-based evidence has become both wasteful and distortive: wasteful
for being overly concerned with witness testimony when other types of
evidence should take precedence, and distortive for distracting courts from
process-based evidence's independent evidentiary worth.
A. Confrontation Clause
Consider, first, the puzzling treatment of process-based evidence in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The Confrontation Clause states, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. . . ."" Stated succinctly in its modem
interpretation, in criminal cases in which the prosecution introduces
accusatory testimonial evidence, the defendant has the right to test (or
"confront") his accuser through cross-examination.91
From a baseline level of justice, the Confrontation Clause is both
sensible and appealing-few would discount the normative value of
subjecting one's accusers to scrutiny.92 But recent Supreme Court decisions
have encouraged the conceptualization of the Confrontation Clause as a rule
primarily aimed at the production and testing of witnesses, even when the
accusatory evidence at issue is process-based.93 The treatment of DNA
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3.
9 1. Id.
92. Danforth v. Crist, No. Civ. 01-2137JRTRLE, 2005 WL 2105502, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 26,
2005) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the significance of cross-examination in the
criminal justice system."); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (noting that cross-
examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970))); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965)
(holding that cross-examination of an accuser is a "fundamental right" essential to a fair trial).
93. E.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 659 (2011); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358;
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009); Davis, 547 U.S. at 821-22; Crawford,
541 U.S. at 68-69.
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evidence, for example, provides an immediate display of suboptimal person-
based rules. Evaluating DNA invokes a quintessential process. Unlike other
forensic examiners, a DNA lab custodian does not primarily rely on his
subjective judgment. Rather, a process determines the defendant's DNA
profile and the probability that it would randomly have the same
characteristics as the crime scene sample.94 Recent technology such as
TrueAllele further reduce human involvement in the DNA typing process.95
Conceptually, then, DNA evidence can be viewed from two different
perspectives. First, in accordance with its process-based nature, DNA
evidence can be seen as the product of an impersonal, standardized procedure
(i.e., DNA typing) that is accomplished primarily through procedures,
machines, and computers. Alternatively, DNA evidence might be seen as the
product of the human actor-the lab technician-despite the fact that this
individual is acting largely mechanically (putting the samples into the
machine, starting the test, evaluating the results, etc.) and is arguably
nonessential in the grand scheme of DNA typing. The first view is
unquestionably the appropriate approach, as the reliability of DNA typing
comes from its standardized processes, not the decisions of any individual
technician. 9 6
But how does our witness-based evidentiary regime treat this evidence?
Lamentably, the forest is lost as we fixate upon a tree. In Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that certified forensic lab reports are
testimonial, and thus inadmissible unless accompanied by a technician-a
human witness-who can certify and attest to the report.9 7
The basic result from cases like Melendez-Diaz is that the Confrontation
Clause demands that a forensic analyst appear in court and be available for
94. Evaluating DNA is almost entirely process-driven. That is, the method by which one derives
probative value from either a DNA match or the lack thereof is objective; there is no subjective
determination as to whether sample DNA matches a target. DNA typing involves the comparison
of high-variance loci in the human genome. Each of these loci will possess a code sequence that-
at certain areas in the human genome-vary widely from one person to the next. Thus, the process
of confirming a DNA match works as follows: at the first locus, genetic material acquired from a
crime scene will be compared to sample DNA provided by a defendant. If the code sequences at
this first locus are exactly the same in both the defendant's DNA and the DNA recovered from the
crime scene, then it becomes somewhat more likely that the crime scene DNA belongs to the
defendant. However, if there is variance between the crime scene DNA and the defendant's DNA
at the first locus, the defendant can be ruled out as a suspect for the crime. By repeating this process
across many loci, DNA typing techniques can drive the probability that multiple individuals possess
the same DNA to a vanishingly small figure. 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 30:3 (2018) (providing an introduction to DNA terminology and a taxonomy of typing
systems).
95. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 98.
96. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 30:3 (2018).
97. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308, 311, 329. Melendez-Diaz focused on laboratory




cross-examination." From a textual or originalist standpoint, perhaps this
line of precedent is justified since, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, "the
accused [must] enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. .. ."99 But from a functional perspective, does the analyst's mere
presence on the witness stand truly satisfy the Confrontation Clause? After
all, given the systematic, repetitive nature of her work, the analyst is highly
unlikely to remember the specifics of a particular sample processed. And at
least among more scientific forensic techniques-such as DNA testing,"oo
blood tests,"0 ' and chemical identification1 02 -any serious laboratory will
have tight controls.1 03 Excepting extraordinary cases, the technician will
follow some preset laboratory procedure.'" The appropriate target for
confrontation is therefore the standardized process, not the specific
technician. It is the process, not the individual technician, that establishes or
proves a fact for trial. It is the process, not the technician, that is accusatory
towards the defendant. Yet, the current evidentiary framework only sees the
witness. Process-based evidence is forced into a witness-centric system.0 s
98. Id.; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319-20, 329.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3.
100. DNA evidence was considered in the Confrontation Clause context in Williams v. Illinois,
567 U.S. 50, 58 (2012).
101. Blood tests were considered in the Confrontation Clause context in Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 653, 659 (2011).
102. Chemical identification was considered in the Confrontation Clause context in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308, 329 (2009).
103. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996) (discussing quality control and quality assistance guidelines for forensic
laboratories).
104. See, e.g., id. at 9-46 (providing examples of procedures followed in analyzing DNA).
105. One of the more remarkable aspects of the current treatment of DNA evidence (and like
process-based evidence) is that the Supreme Court was required to make a retreat--or, at a bare
minimum, a shift-from prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence simply to ensure the centrality
of the witness stand was not lost. Consider the year 1970, when a plurality of the Supreme Court
wrote in Dutton v. Evans that: "[tihe decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the
Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials by assuring that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement." 440 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
During the Dutton era, then, Confrontation was largely aimed at improving the accuracy of
the truth-finding process. See id. (stating the mission ofthe Clause). The witness stand was simply
one means to that end. Reliable and accurate truth finding was sought, and cross-examination via
the witness stand was a natural way to achieve such a goal when person-based evidence was at issue.
But just as process-based evidence became increasingly common in the courtroom, a new
justification for Confrontation emerged. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) ("[Statements] are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.");
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,59 (2004) ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from
trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
2019] 1095
Texas Law Review
Significant tradeoffs result from this misplaced reliance on the witness
stand; in many ways, Melendez-Diaz and its progeny have worked against
rather than for an effective trial system. The first notable loss comes by way
of decreased efficiencies. 106 Requiring the analyst to appear in court to vouch
for every report necessarily removes him from the lab, where he could be
processing samples, 10 7 and creates complexities in court scheduling.o10 More
fundamentally, cross-examining the witness constitutes a weak test of the
evidence at best, because the technician is merely a proxy. In some instances,
the analyst may be able to explain the nuances of DNA typing, and the
process can be attacked through cross-examination of the witness. More
often, the lab custodian may have an incomplete (or worse, inaccurate)
understanding of DNA typing or otherwise avoid testifying about anything
other than the computerized test result." Indeed, scholars have recognized
that "[t]oday, a forensic scientist witness often does not appear at trial to
describe a manual scientific analysis. Rather, the witness will [simply] testify
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."). Rapidly, the witness stand lost its status as a mere
means to a greater truth-centric end and wholly became the end in and of itself. See Bryant, 562
U.S. at 358 (stating the "basic objective" of the Confrontation Clause is to provide the defendant
with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (focusing on the
testimonial or nontestimonial nature of a statement rather than its veracity); Crawford, 541 U.S. at
59 (holding that statements made by a declarant absent from trial can be admitted only if the
defendant had previously cross-examined the witness). Indeed, the lengths to which the Supreme
Court has gone to entrench its relatively new witness-centric view of Confrontation is startling, as
the most recent Confrontation cases unequivocally state that the Confrontation Clause "commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing [a
witness] in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 ("To be sure, the Clause's
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee.").
106. This concern was a major focus of the dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 340-41 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), as well as Justice Breyer's
concurrmg opinon i Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 89-90 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer, in particular, noted that there exists "no logical stopping place between requiring the
prosecution to call as a witness one of the laboratory experts who worked on the matter and requiring
the prosecution to call all of the laboratory experts who did so." Williams, 567 U.S. at 89 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
107. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "analysts
already spen[d] considerable time appearing as witnesses in those few cases where the defendant ...
contested the analyst's result and subpoenaed the analyst" and that the Melendez-Diaz mandate that
an analyst "appear in the far greater number of cases where defendants do not dispute the analyst's
result [will] impose[] enormous costs on the administration of justice"); see also infra notes 211-
26. But see Catharine L. Bonventre, The Implementation of Judicial Policy in Crime Laboratories:
An Examination of the Impact of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (Ph.D. dissertation) (2015)
(finding that Melendez-Diaz's requirement did not create practical difficulties in a number of
jurisdictions for a variety of reasons).
108. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 341 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (considering the effect of
mandatory analyst testimony on case scheduling).
109. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 97-98 (stating that witnesses are rarely called about




about the results of an automated forensic technique that he or she
oversaw."110 Of course, this problem is not limited to DNA tests. In-court
scrutiny of breathalyzer tests also often neglects the internal, mechanical
processes that actually generated the result and instead focuses on the
surrogate witness."' Imwinkelried describes a common scenario:
In a drunk driving case, the witness is rarely a toxicologist testifying
about a manual oxidative analysis of the alcohol concentration in a
blood sample that he or she personally drew from the suspect. It is far
more likely that the witness will be a police officer trained to use an
Intoxilyzer that samples the suspect's breath and contains a computer
program that reads out an estimate of the suspect's breath alcohol
concentration.112
A final loss that comes from the fixation on the witness stand is seen by
the penalty for failing to meet the witness requirement: exclusion. In
Melendez-Diaz, the absence of the analyst rendered the entire test
inadmissible."' The drastic remedy is entirely disproportionate to the
"offense."l14
Part IV outlines an alternative method for scrutinizing forensic lab
results without resort to traditional cross-examination."' These alternative
tools will not only make sense from an efficiency standpoint, but will also
produce more legitimate trials through increased assurances of reliability and
accurate truth finding.
B. Expert Evidence and the Learned Treatise Exception
A similar type mismatch is found in the "learned treatise" exception to
hearsay under Rule 803(18)."6 The reliability of most academic publications
come as the result of a process. Take, for example, a scientific peer-reviewed
article. Scientific articles are subject to peer review and editorial scrutiny
prior to acceptance, proofreading prior to publication, and community
scrutiny and comment after publication."' While this system necessarily
110. Id. at 97.
111. See id. at 97-98.
112. Id.
113. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329.
114. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Melendez-Diaz majority opinion "threatens to disrupt forensic investigations across the country and
to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when
a particular laboratory technician, now invested by the Court's new constitutional designation as the
analyst, simply does not or cannot appear").
115. See infra subpart III(B).
116. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
117. For background on the rise of scientific peer review, see generally Ray Spier, The History
of the Peer-Review Process, 20 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 357, 357-58 (2002) and David R.
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involves human actors, it is primarily process-based. The reliability of a
scientific article stems from the quality assurances provided by the entire
publication process rather than the ipse dixit of a particular author. The
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(18) acknowledge the process-based
nature of learned treatises, specifically highlighting that the treatises'
reliability stems from the fact that scientific articles are "subject to scrutiny
and exposure for inaccuracy" through the existing publication regime."1 I
But while the Rules properly identify this evidence as process-based,
they do not give it proper process-based treatment. Granted, Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(18) carves out a hearsay exception for learned treatises," 9
allowing a party to introduce any excerpt from a scientific article or similar
publication without the typical restraints of the hearsay rule.120 But then, Rule
803(18) requires a person (an expert) to appear in court to vouch for the
reliability of the article. 12 1 Moreover, Rule 803(18) forbids the use of the
learned treatise as an exhibit; it may only be read aloud to the jury by a
witness. 12 2
Once again, Rule 803(18) needlessly emphasizes the witness. Typically,
the expert who reads a publication into the record is not the author of that
article. As such, the expert is merely an "informed" third party, guiding jurors
on how they should understand and apply the treatise. 123 In the absence of the
expert, the parties themselves could fulfill that role. Presumably, having the
expert might help, but the treatise expert's role is not so essential to warrant
the present treatment, which requires that scientific articles be presented
through an expert or not at all. 124
Guston, The Expanding Role ofPeer Review Processes in the United States, in PROCEEDINGS FROM
THE 2000 U.S.-EUROPEAN WORKSHOP ON LEARNING FROM SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
EVALUATION 4-31 (Philip Shapira & Stefan Kuhlmann eds., 2001).
118. FED. R. EvI. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
119. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
120. FED. R. EvID. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
121. FED. R. EviD. 803(18) (noting that the learned treatise is only admissible if it is "called to
the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct
examination" and "read into evidence" by the expert).
122. Id.
123. Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing the Useful Information Provided by Experts
in the Courtroom: A Comparison ofFederal Rules ofEvidence 703 and 803 (18) with the Evidence
Rules in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 183, 227-28 (1995) (stating the
purpose of Rule 803(18) is to "prevent a fact finder from perusing [the learned treatise] without the
assistance of the expert witness" to explain the text's meaning).
124. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
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The treatise expert is a source of potential distortion as well, 125 because
the proponent chooses the expert. 126 Thus, the goal of the treatise expert is
not to neutrally aid the jury in its understanding or application of the
treatise. 127 Rather, the expert will undoubtedly interpret the treatise in line
with the narrative advanced by his employer. 128 Such a slant stands in direct
contrast to the treatise, whose trustworthiness derives from the publication
process. Perhaps most importantly, Rule 803(18)'s insistence on an expert
surrogate contradicts the rationale for the rule itself. Recall that proponents
of the learned treatise exception primarily founded their support on the rigors
of the process. 129 However, Rule 803(18) forbids the manuscript from being
submitted to the jury as an exhibit-it may reach the ears of the jury only
through a surrogate expert's mouth.130 Such a move is again baffling,
considering that it is the treatise, not the expert, that has undergone scrutiny
to ensure trustworthiness.
The treatise is not mere support for an expert witness. The treatise is
evidence, evidence that-in many instances-has assurances of
trustworthiness far beyond the expert hired to read it to the jury.
C. Photographs
As a third example, consider photographs, an archetype of process-
based evidence. Much of a photograph's evidentiary worth arises from the
common knowledge that a camera will provide a reliable depiction of a scene
regardless of the import vel non of any particular shot.'3 1 Because of its
125. Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482 (1986)
("An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how
frivolous. . . .").
126. See BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT: RECONCILING LAW,
SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 6 (2005) ("[M]any commentators have observed that
lawyers often have a sufficient number ofavailable expert witnesses to allow them to select one that
will best represent a client's partisan interests."); see also Bernstein, supra note 82, at 453-55
(noting that the selection of expert witnesses by adversarial parties creates "adversarial bias").
127. See Bernstein, supra note 82, at 453-54. Berstein explains the distortion:
[T]he implicit rationale for the modern special rules for expert testimony is that such
testimony is uniquely vulnerable to "adversarial bias." Adversarial bias refers to
witness bias that arises because a party to an adversarial proceeding retains experts to
advance its cause. Adversarial bias has at least three sources: (1) conscious bias,
(2) unconscious bias, and (3) selection bias.
Id.
128. Id. at 454-55 ("The problem of conscious bias arises when 'hired guns' adapt their
opinions to the needs of the attorney who hires them.").
129. FED. R. EvID. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
130. FED. R. EviD. 803(18) (noting that learned treatises "may be read into evidence but not
received as an exhibit").
131. See generally Jordan S. Gruber et al., Video Technology, 58 AM. JUR. TRIALS 481, 525-
45 (1996) (describing various types of video and photographic technology and advising attorneys
on their evidentiary potential).
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internal electronics and mechanics, we know that a camera uses the same
process to create a photograph every time.132 Questions about whether a
picture provides an accurate representation of a scene, then, should focus on
that internal process: for example, whether there is any systematic error in
the camera that is replicated in each photograph produced therefrom.133
But the legal system's prevailing treatment of photographic evidence
does not account for its process-based nature. Again, our evidentiary regime
keeps the jury's focus squarely on the witness stand.13 4 In standard courtroom
practice, a witness takes the stand and adopts a photograph as a "fair and
accurate representation" of some object or location. The photograph is
therefore an illustration of the witness's testimony, but is not evidence
itself.' Rather than allowing a photograph to stand on its own as a highly
probative depiction of a particular scene, our legal system relegates it to a
once-removed role where it merely adds color to a witness's account of the
same subject.' 6 For example, a typical examination of photographic
evidence in the courtroom goes as follows:
Attorney: I'm going to show you Government's Exhibit numbers 2
through 4. Take a look at those. Do you recognize those photographs?
Witness: I do.
Attorney: Do they fairly and accurately represent what you observed that
day?
Witness: Yes.
Attorney: ... Your Honor, we'd offer Government's Exhibits 2, 3, and
4 into evidence.
The Court: Any objection?
Opposing Counsel: No objection ....
132. Id. at 525-35.
133. For example, to consider how a systematic error affecting the hue of photographs might
impact their probative worth, see Jessica M. Salerno, Seeing Red: Disgust Reactions to Gruesome
Photographs in Color (But Not in Black and White) Increase Convictions, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 336, 345-47 (2017).
134. See Mnookin, supra note 7, at 67 ("[D]emonstrative evidence sounds like precisely the
epistemic category that emerged from the judicial response to the photograph.").
135. Demonstrative evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); FED. R. EVID. 1002
Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. The Notes describe common practice:
The usual course is for a witness on the stand to identify the photograph or motion
picture as a correct representation of events which he saw or of a scene with which he
is familiar. In fact he adopts the picture as his testimony, or, in common parlance, uses
the picture to illustrate his testimony. Under these circumstances, no effort is made to
prove the contents of the picture, and the rule is inapplicable.
Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., Scarlett v. Ouellette, 948 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
("[A]ny witness with knowledge that the photograph is a fair and accurate representation may lay
the necessary foundation for admission of a photograph.").
136. See Mnookin, supra note 7, at 67 (discussing the treatment of photographs as
demonstrative and illustrative rather than conclusive).
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The Court: They're admitted.
Attorney: Start with Government's Exhibit number 2?
Witness: Yes, this is a photograph of Mr. Nuckles.
Attorney: That[] depicts his clothing as well as his demeanor that day?
Witness: Correct.
Attorney: Okay. Government's Exhibit number 3?
Witness: This was the suitcase that I took out of the back seat of
Mr. Nuckles'[s] Car.
Attorney: ... Okay. And Government's Exhibit 4?
Witness: This is the open suitcase showing the drugs which were inside
the suitcase.13 7
Such treatment is again wasteful and potentially distortive. It is wasteful
in unnecessarily requiring a witness to repeat what is plainly depicted in the
photograph itself.13 1 It is potentially distortive because at least technically,
the law treats a photograph's evidentiary worth on par with other
demonstrative evidence (such as graphs, charts, and posters) rather than
recognizing its independent value-and more often than not, superiority-as
evidence.' 9 We all know though that a photograph's power lies not in its
illustration of a witness's testimony, as if it were a mere sketch or drawing.
Its power comes from the photograph being the result of a mechanical process
that provides consistently reliable depictions of a scene. Creative
camerawork can undoubtedly skew photographs, but only so much, and such
skewing is far more constrained than with witness testimony.1 4 0 Advocates
do not introduce, and factfinders do not prefer and use, photographic
evidence because it is illustrative. That photograph is evidence, indeed far
better evidence than the words coming out of the witness's mouth. The
witness provides important context, but she is not the star.
To be sure, despite their witness focus, the evidentiary rules have not
entirely overlooked the process-based nature of photographs. For example,
the silent witness theory admits photographs even when there is no one to
adopt them as demonstrative evidence, 141 a doctrine especially useful for
137. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 21-22, United States v. Nuckles, Criminal Case No.
1:14-CR-218-ODE-AJB, 2015 WL 1600687 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2014), aff'd, 649 Fed. Appx. 834
(11th Cir. 2016).
138. Note, for example, that in the representative transcript provided above, the witness's sole
responsibility was to provide a characterization of the photographs provided to him by the attorney.
139. See Mnookin, supra note 7, at 67-70.
140. See Richard Zakia, Perception, Evidence, Truth, and Seeing (providing examples of
photography techniques capable of influencing perception), in THE CONCISE FOCAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHOTOGRAPHY: FROM THE FIRST PHOTO ON PAPER TO THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION 239, 239-50 (Michael R. Peres et al. eds., 2012).
141. United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the "'silent
witness' model, under which the admissibility of a photograph is based on the reliability of the
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surveillance footage. 14 2 But the silent witness theory is a second-best, almost
last-ditch effort to save critical and reliable evidence from exclusion. Indeed,
courts have found the silent witness theory applicable only "where obviously
no witness has viewed the scene portrayed."'4 3 The silent witness theory was
not the product of any recognition of the advantages of the process relative
to the witness; it was merely the product of necessity." The witness still
reigns supreme.
D. Business Records Exception
The doctrine most responsive to process-based evidence still misses the
mark. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) acknowledges that the regular,
standardized records of a business are generally reliable and therefore should
not be deemed inadmissible under the hearsay rule.' 4 5 As noted by the
Advisory Committee:
The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously
to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity
which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in
relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of
a continuing job or occupation.1 4 6
Stated succinctly, the Rules recognize that a business record-despite
potential human involvement-is quintessential process-based evidence that
acquires its reliability from standardized procedures rather than from any one
individual or declarant.1 47 Applying the hearsay rule, a witness-based
protection, to process-based evidence would give rise to inefficiencies and,
therefore, such treatment has been avoided through an exception.
But the history of Rule 803(6) shows just how difficult it is to get the
legal system to think outside the witness box. The business records exception
was the product of a massive reform effort brought about by the sheer
impracticality of calling all of the declarants involved in the creation of a
process by which it is made"); see also Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States,
62 STAN. L. REv. 1119, 1165 (2010) (discussing the "silent witness theory" as an option when no
witness can personally testify as to the object of the photograph).
142. Natalie F. Pike, Note, When Discretion to Record Becomes Assertive: Body Camera
Footage As Hearsay, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1259,1256 n.32 (2018) ("Surveillance cameras
are often silent witnesses because they record without human operation, input, or interference.").
143. Rembert, 863 F.2d at 1026.
144. See id. (discussing the development of the silent witness theory to cover situations such as
x-ray photography where it is impossible for a witness to personally view the object of interest).
145. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).




single record, such as a bank statement.148 As far back as 1927, studies by the
Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund insisted that process-
based standardization rendered business documents reliable,14 9 and that the
regularity and continuity of the processes provide unusual assurances of
trustworthiness sufficient to outweigh the concerns underlying the hearsay
exclusionary rule. 5 o But despite its recognition of process-based reliability,
the exception, for decades after it was adopted, still required the introduction
of a custodian-a witness-to testify about the business procedure."'
Analogous to Rule 803(18)'s learned treatise exception, a witness had to take
the stand and largely serve as a conduit for emphatically nonpersonal
evidence.' 52 Only recently did the Advisory Committee finally amend the
rule to allow a certification instead of the live custodian-a rare
acknowledgment that reliability comes from the process, not any in-court
human surrogate.15 3
Although Rule 803(6) represents a step in the right direction towards the
appropriate treatment of process-based evidence, it fails to provide a
comprehensive procedure for handling standardized material in the
courtroom. The hearsay rule is, of course, an admissibility rule.154 It is a
binary barrier that does not provide a means of adjusting evidentiary weight.
To see how this presents a problem for business records, consider the
following hypothetical. Imagine that a litigant wants to prove that because of
the defendant's actions she had to draw extra electrical power for three
weeks."55 To prove this, she presents her electric bill. The bill shows the
148. Frank T. Read, The Business Records Exception: Something Less Than Revolutionary,
LrrIG., Fall 1975, at 25, 25.
149. See Sidney Kwestel, The Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule-New Is Not
Necessarily Better, 64 Mo. L. REV. 595, 595 & n.4 (1999) (discussing how the business records
exception attained widespread support).
150. Anthony J. Dreyer, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility ofElectronic Mail
Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2285, 2305-07 (1996).
151. The decades-long approach allowed for:
[Business records] containing hearsay provided foundation testimony is made by
'the custodian or other qualified witness,' that: (1) the declarant in the records had
personal knowledge to make accurate statements; (2) the declarant recorded the
statements contemporaneously with the actions that were the subject of the reports;
(3) the declarant made the record in the regular course of the business activity; and
(4) such records were regularly kept by the business.
United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
152. See id.
153. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) Notes of Advisory Committee on 2000 Amendment. Under the
modem regime, the certification necessary for admitting a business record must be executed by a
person who would otherwise be qualified to testify as a custodian. See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon
Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004).
154. See FED. R. EvID. 802 (rendering hearsay generally inadmissible).
155. For a similar, real-world example, consider N.L.R.B. v. First Termite Control Co., 646
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amount last year, the amount this year, and the increase. The difference
provides an estimate of the damages. However, if there is human involvement
in the creation of the bill, it is hearsay and inadmissible absent an exception.
The litigant then must get a certification from the electric company to render
the bill admissible (and of course, before certifications, she would have had
to call a custodian from the electric company). But the kicker here is that
certification is largely beside the point. What our evidentiary regime
primarily needs is not a certification from the electric company but instead
scrutiny of the electric company's systematic practices to ensure that the bill
constitutes an accurate representation of the litigant's power usage, and
specifically that those practices did not change since the previous year.
The business records exception is therefore an incomplete response to
process-based evidence. Our evidentiary regime needs a toolset that does not
merely manage the admissibility of process-based evidence but one that also
offers an effective means of probing its evidentiary worth.
IV. Toward Process-Based Evidence Rules
How can courts best handle process-based evidence? As previously
discussed, traditional evidence rules are not up to the task and unsurprisingly
so. Our current system of evidentiary rules evolved under the assumption that
witness-based evidence was both more prevalent and more normatively
desirable than other forms of evidence.' 56 It simply was not built with
process-based evidence in mind.157 In recent years, practical pressures have
necessitated a series of workarounds, like the business records exception,158
the learned treatise exception,1 59 and the treatment of photographs as
demonstrative evidence.160 But these workarounds are just that. They are ad
hoc patches that have propped up the traditional framework and, at great cost,
maintained the focus on the witness. They do not contribute to its long-term
survival or coherence.
Rather than trying to fit a round peg into a square hole, this Part attempts
to develop a new approach for handling process-based evidence. Doing so,
however, need not entail an outright rejection of traditional evidentiary
principles. While the traditional rules are inappropriate for process-based
evidence, we can learn much from their underlying philosophy. In essence,
traditional evidence law can serve as a template for a new system regulating
F.2d 424, 426, 428-30 (9th Cir. 1981), in which an entire appeal centered around the difficulty of
admitting a freight bill due to its proponent calling a supporting witness who, according to the Ninth
Circuit, was not sufficiently qualified to vouch for the authenticity of the bill.
156. See generally Fisher, supra note 1, at 602-24; Langbein, supra note 9, at 1169-72.
157. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 602-24; Langbein, supra note 9, at 1169-72.
158. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
159. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
160. FED. R. EvID. 1002; Mnookin, supra note 7, at 67-70.
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process-based evidence. For example, the three classical mechanisms used
for ensuring reliable witness-based evidence are the oath, the ability of the
factfinder to observe witness demeanor, and cross-examination.'
Obviously, none of these mechanisms are directly applicable to process-
based evidence. Courts cannot put machines, business processes, or other
standardized systems under oath, observe their demeanor, or cross-examine
them. But courts can construct new mechanisms to achieve their functional
equivalents. New rules can make the processes that underlie process-based
evidence more transparent to the jury, provide opportunities for an opposing
party to attack them, and give guidance on how to assess their reliability.
Thus, at a broad conceptual level, this Part advances a template for
achieving those normative goals. The following sections provide a series of
reforms and reconceptualizations that will bring our evidentiary regime into
the twenty-first century, enabling it to efficiently and effectively scrutinize
process-based evidence. Where the witness is no longer necessary, the
witness should no longer be mandatory.
As an initial matter, we argue that the compulsory process power should
be expanded to allow for increased access to the processes or standardized
systems generating evidence in particular cases. Allowing litigants to test
these systems firsthand brings much-needed transparency to the domain of
process-based evidence and largely eliminates the risk that unnecessary
witnesses might distort determinations of a process's reliability.
Complementing this suggestion of increased access is a reconceptualization
of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause with respect to process-based
evidence. When an accusation stems from a process and not a person,
appropriate scrutiny of the process (even in the absence of an in-court
witness) should satisfy these doctrines. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, we advance a holistic framework for scrutinizing the reliability
of process-based evidence in the courtroom. Rather than equating the
reliability of a process with the reliability of some surrogate witness, we
argue that the probative value of process-based evidence should instead
directly depend on the underlying process's transparency, falsifiability, and
objectivity.
A. Reframing the Subpoena
Because the star of a witness-based system is in-court testimony, courts
have developed powerful tools for ensuring the presence of witnesses.16 2 The
161. FISHER, supra note 80, at 377-78; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Triangulating Hearsay,
87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974).
162. To be sure, the traditional evidence rules outline exceptions to witness production for
certain forms of hearsay, information subject to judicial notice, and demonstrative aids, but
undeniably, the primary avenue for receiving information is live, in-court testimony from a witness.
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subpoena power and the Compulsory Process Clause, for example, ensure
that knowledgeable witnesses take the stand and provide useful
information. 163 Indeed, some foundational aspects of our adjudicatory
system, such as jury observation of an opponent's cross-examination, are
impossible without live witnesses. 16 Compulsory process is, in many ways,
the source from which the rest of evidence law flows.
The irony is that compulsory process-at least as it is traditionally
understood-provides little help to someone challenging process-based
evidence. All that compulsory process ensures is a witness who will present
the photograph, the business record, or the forensic lab result. Further, as
discussed in Part III, cross-examining that witness yields little because what
an opponent needs to challenge is the process itself, not its witness
surrogate. 165 The witness surrogate may have only limited knowledge of the
internal workings of the process and can otherwise easily resist further
questioning.166
What process-based evidence requires is a functional analog to being
"called to the stand," a functional analog to the traditional subpoena. For a
witness, taking the stand creates transparency: the factfinder and the public
can see and scrutinize the witness. 167 Taking the stand also exposes the
witness to cross-examination." Process-based evidence is therefore in need
of a procedural tool that will achieve those same results-a tool that will
render process-based evidence more transparent and vulnerable to scrutiny.
Enhanced discovery is just such a tool. Conventionally, discovery
conjures up images of banker's boxes or hard drives full of documents, and
in some cases, that will precisely be what the opposing party needs to
challenge process-based evidence. Discovery of calibration results,
performance reviews, standard operating procedures, company policies,
design documents, and the like all enable an opponent to scrutinize the
process that created the process-based evidence and challenge its reliability.
But sometimes, "putting the process on the stand" requires more than
conventional discovery. After all, not every machine or business procedure
163. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 4; FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (governing subpoena power in civil
cases); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (governing subpoena power in criminal cases); GEORGE FISHER,
EVIDENCE 730-31 (3d ed. 2013) (detailing how courts have interpreted the Sixth Amendment to
allow defendants to put witnesses on the stand).
164. FISHER, supra note 80, at 377-78.
165. See supra subpart III(A).
166. Lmwinkelried, supra note 20, at 97-98 ("Today, a forensic scientist witness often does not
appear at trial to describe a manual scientific analysis. Rather, the witness will testify about the
results of an automated forensic technique that he or she oversaw.").




has been subjected to calibration or performance reviews. 169 Instead, an
opponent may want access to the machine or process itself. If a mass
spectrometer provides critical evidence in a case, the opponent may wish to
test that machine using known samples. If a laboratory used a standard
procedure to test for cocaine, then the opponent may wish to send blinded
(but known) test samples to challenge the lab's accuracy.
Naturally, courts would need to carefully monitor and limit such access.
The machines still belong to the other party, and we might worry about
opponents damaging them (either inadvertently or intentionally). Internal
procedures may contain trade secrets or have other ramifications for
competition.170 But such court involvement is arguably no different than how
courts police access to and interactions with witnesses in the courtroom.
Perhaps early on, courts will have to puzzle out how to provide appropriate
access to lab equipment or internal processes. But like anything else, standard
legal practices will emerge over time. Challenging the calibration of a blood
alcohol testing device will become no different than cross-examining an
eyewitness.
These concerns about enhanced discovery cohere with recent academic
scholarship proposing new frameworks for gaining access to source codes or
challenging machine evidence. For example, Professor Edward Imwinkelried
has recently recognized that computer source code, such as the code used to
determine whether a DNA match exists, has generally been exempted from
scrutiny by litigants, even where that source code produces outputs that
become evidence in the courtroom.171 Because it is the process, not any one
person, that is generating the evidence, we agree with Imwinkelried that the
defense should have a limited right of access to examine the source code
directly.172 Professor Andrea Roth has similarly recognized that so-called
machine testimony-that is, information provided by processes such as
cameras, thermometers, and other mechanical systems-has hereto been
mishandled in courtrooms.7 7 For Roth, the patchwork doctrines that have
emerged are "intellectually incoherent and fail to fully empower juries to
assess machine credibility."1 74 Roth, like Imwinkelried, would engage
169. Just as not every witness has readily available (or admissible) eye exams, psychiatric
evaluations, or character witnesses to attack or attest to their character for truthfulness.
170. The problem of trade secrets is a complicated one requiring more development. One
should be able to make analogies to witness privileges, however. Just as various privileges protect
witnesses from certain lines of inquiry on the stand, trade-secret-privilege law would protect entities
from having to disclose certain information in process-based discovery. However, just as witness
privileges yield under some circumstances, so would trade-secret privileges.
171. Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 98-101.
172. Id. at 97, 101.
173. Roth, supra note 20, at 2000-22.
174. Id. at 1972.
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machine testimony on its own terms, focusing credibility and reliability
assessments on a machine's internal processes rather than the witness
stand. 175
Our proposal favoring enhanced discovery coheres with Imwinkelried
and Roth, though our proposal extends to the broader category of process-
based evidence. By increasing direct access to the systems generating
evidence in particular cases-including machines, business practices, and
even publication procedures-reliability assessments quickly become more
meaningful, and witness-based obfuscation is eliminated.
B. Recasting Hearsay and Confrontation
Reformation of the subpoena power, standing alone, would provide an
incomplete solution; complementary reforms are necessary elsewhere in the
evidentiary rules. Compulsory process goes hand-in-hand with the hearsay
rule and the Confrontation Clause. The subpoena helps secure witness
attendance at trial. If a party fails to provide a witness, then the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause will generally exclude the evidence."
However, as discussed above, the intense, witness-based focus of the hearsay
rule and recent Confrontation jurisprudence leads to wasteful and distortive
results when applied to process-based evidence. Therefore, allowing for
increased access to the systems underlying process-based evidence would
ultimately prove fruitless unless hearsay and confrontation are also adapted
to our process-based world.
1. Hearsay.-The conventional hearsay rule improperly manages
process-based evidence, whether produced by machines or by people. For
machine-generated evidence, the hearsay rule is inapplicable because the rule
only covers assertions made by a person."'7 For person-generated process
evidence, the hearsay rule is both too strict and too lax. It is too strict in
requiring that declarants testify, because the reliability of process-based
evidence derives from the underlying process, not the individuals involved.
It is also too lax in that the business records exception often offers a
workaround,1 78 giving business records a free pass. Statements made in the
regular course of business are indeed typically more reliable than one-off
statements, but what if the processes are fundamentally flawed? What if a
business's procedures in a particular context incentivize employees to inflate
or distort their numbers? Opposing parties need the ability to meaningfully
175. Id. at 2022-23.
176. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3; FED. R. EVID. 802.
177. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) ("'Statement' means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.").
178. FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
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access and scrutinize those business processes, as well as other hearsay-
producing processes.
What is therefore necessary is an analog to the hearsay rule for process-
based evidence, one that would provide meaningful access and the ability to
challenge processes. The reconceptualized process-based hearsay rule would
seek to achieve the same ends sought by the traditional, witness-based
hearsay rule-namely the opportunity for opponents to test evidentiary
assertions in court-but it would do so in full recognition of the significant
conceptual differences between the two types of evidence.
A reconceptualized hearsay rule would admit process-based hearsay
through two paths. The first path, analogous to live testimony subject to
cross-examination, is actually to provide opponents with access and the
ability to scrutinize the underlying processes, as discussed in subpart IV(A)'s
enhanced discovery proposal above. In allowing litigants to directly
scrutinize the system that generated evidence in a particular case, the process-
based hearsay rule achieves the same functional goals as the traditional
hearsay rule in that opposing parties are offered the opportunity to examine
critical junctures of reliability and make weak points visible to the jury.179 At
the same time, however, the process-based hearsay rule ends the
unnecessary-and indeed, inaccurate-procedure that suggests that the
reliability of process-based evidence hinges primarily on a witness surrogate.
The second path for the admissibility of process-based hearsay would
be a new class of enumerated exceptions analogous to Rules 803 and 804 for
witness-based evidence. These exceptions to enhanced discovery and access
would involve instances in which courts could presume that process-based
evidence was sufficiently reliable for jury consideration. The rule-based
structure of the exceptions would promote uniformity, efficiency, and
predictability.18 ' For example, one can imagine an exception for evidence
produced by machines certified by government agencies or evidence
produced by processes accredited by an independent third party." There
could be an exception for standard, commercially available processes, such
as cameras, phones, and computers (or they could even be handled via
judicial notice). Finally, as an analog to Rule 804, an exception might admit
179. Compare this solution to the (near-identical) benefits gained by cross-examining a witness
about person-based evidence. See Tribe, supra note 173, at 958 (noting cross-examination of a
person reveals inaccuracies in the inferential chain between the object of a description and the
testimony itself).
180. See Liesa L. Richter, Goldilocks and the Rule 803 Hearsay Exceptions, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 897, 947 (2018) (advocating for the expansion of Rule 803 hearsay exceptions rather than
"upending the entire system" or "implementing unique restrictions applicable only to single
exceptions").
181. Cf FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (providing a hearsay exception for public records so long as the
source and other circumstances do not indicate a lack of trustworthiness).
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evidence produced by machines and processes no longer available for testing
if certain contextual guarantees of trustworthiness were met.182
Undoubtedly, many of the same types of evidence admissible today
under the hearsay rule will remain so under the new regime. But the point is
that the enhanced discovery rule and its exceptions will be uniquely
structured to handle process-based evidence. No longer will we be trying to
contort the hearsay rule to do work that it was not designed to do. And the
key distinction is not whether a person was involved, as the hearsay rule's
current definition implies. The key distinction is whether a person was
engaged in an ad hoc judgment, in which case the witness-based hearsay rule
should apply, or whether there was a standardized process involved, in which
case the new regime should apply.
2. Confrontation Clause.-Process-based evidence similarly requires a
rethinking of Confrontation doctrine. Recall that Melendez-Diaz and its
progeny require that the prosecution produce a live witness when presenting
forensic evidence."' But as we argued in subpart H(A), this requirement is
just an empty shell. A lab analyst who processes countless samples over the
course of a day surely does not remember how she analyzed a particular
sample. Any testimony she gives will in reality derive from written
documents (i.e., hearsay); so the presence of a witness is mere formalism.
Besides, the ultimate source of reliability is not the analyst, but rather the
system of checks and procedures that characterizes the lab. Demanding that
the prosecution introduce the lab analyst as a live witness may make for great
theater, but it does little to further the objective of the Confrontation Clause.
Far better would be a Confrontation Clause that provided defendants with
enhanced discovery of the lab's procedures and equipment.
The contours of the Confrontation Clause are of course a matter of
constitutional interpretation, not mere evidentiary policy. So how then can
we recast Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to account for our new
understanding of process-based evidence? As it turns out, acknowledging
process-based evidence requires only a subtle reframing. When it comes to
process-based evidence, the functional accuser-the "witness[] against [the
defendant]" 1 84-is the underlying process, not the various people who may
have contributed to the process. And thus the right of Confrontation involves
182. Cf FED. R. EviD. 804 (unavailability exceptions); FED. R. EvID. 807 (residual hearsay
exception allowing hearsay to be admissible when necessary and reliable).
183. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324-25 (2009). The Melendez-Diaz line
of cases leaves exactly who needs to be called somewhat murky. At minimum, we know that: (a) an
affidavit with no live witness is insufficient, id.; (b) the person cannot be an unrelated co-worker,
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011); and (c) that the person may be an expert
relying on the results of another, Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 58 (2012).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 3.
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the defendant's ability to challenge the process, not a talking head on the
witness stand.
This reframing, however, requires some careful parsing. For example, it
surely cannot be the case that if a forensic hair analyst performs a microscopic
hair comparison"' and writes a report "matching" hair found at the crime
scene to the defendant, then that qualifies as process-based evidence and the
analyst need not testify. In that scenario, it intuitively seems that the
defendant should have a right to cross-examine the specific analyst-after
all, the analyst is making a direct accusation against the defendant. Further
consideration, however, suggests that this example does not involve process-
based evidence at all. The analyst made a subjective comparison of the crime-
scene evidence and the defendant's hair. Referring back to the distinctions
made in Part II, that kind of evidence is witness-based, plain and simple. The
reliability depends on the analyst as an individual, and indeed, from a
Confrontation Clause perspective, that analyst knows whom he is accusing.
The conventional Confrontation Clause requirements of in-court testimony
and cross-examination should apply.
What kind of forensic analysis would qualify as process-based and
warrant different treatment? Suppose the forensic hair analyst performed
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing instead, a process that involves some
manual (human) procedures and some automated (machine) procedures.'86
Further suppose that the analyst is only involved in sequencing; the analyst
does not match the sample mtDNA profile with the defendant and does not
even know who the suspect is. Instead, the lab's computer system, using pre-
specified cutoffs, makes the "match" determination. This sequence results in
process-based evidence. The accusation arises from the process, not the
analyst personally. The analyst's role in the process is to execute tasks
according to the predetermined procedure, and it is the process that cries out
for scrutiny, not the analyst individually.
One can find room in the Supreme Court's existing Confrontation
jurisprudence to accommodate this distinction between witness-based and
process-based evidence. Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming involved witness-
based forensic results because the analysts in both cases knew what the
185. Microscopic hair comparison has been widely discredited as being extremely error-prone
and has been linked to a number of wrongful conviction cases. See generally Edward K. Cheng,
MitochondrialDNA: Emerging Legal Issues, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 99 (2005) (noting the high error rates
involved in microscopic hair analysis and identifying studies linking such analysis to "wrongful
capital convictions"); see also Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 48-51 (2009) (noting that forensic hair
analysis has a high rate of error and has been known to implicate defendants who were later
exonerated by DNA evidence).
186. See Cheng, supra note 185, at 103-05 (noting mtDNA analysis uses the same machinery
as normal DNA analysis, and mtDNA analysts follow the same principles as other DNA analysts).
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desired outcome should be. In Melendez-Diaz, the analyst's task was to
determine if a substance was cocaine;187 in Bullcoming, the analyst was
assessing blood-alcohol content outside a medical setting.'18 Introducing
those forensic reports without the analyst's live testimony therefore violated
the Confrontation Clause.
Williams v. Illinois18 9 presents a very different context.1 90 In Williams,
an outside laboratory performed the DNA sequencing of the crime scene
sample, which was later "matched" to the defendant by a testifying expert.191
The Supreme Court held that this arrangement did not violate Confrontation,
even though the analysts from the outside laboratory did not testify. 192 To be
sure, the primary rationale underlying Williams was that the testifying expert
merely used the outside lab results as a basis for his opinion under Rule 703,
and so it was only the testifying expert who was the accuser. But a cleaner,
alternative theory of the case is that the outside laboratory's DNA profile in
Williams was process-based evidence, unlike in Melendez-Diaz or
Bullcoming. The Williams holding is therefore perfectly consistent with the
theory that process-based evidence should be admissible without a live
witness. 19 3
Finally, as with witness-based evidence, not every piece of process-
based evidence needs to trigger Confrontation Clause protection. Processes
that operate without the intent of producing information for future
prosecution might not be subject to Confrontation's strictures at all.194 Phone
records, for example, are process-based but are not produced with an eye
toward future prosecution. They might be subject to hearsay-type restrictions
but not Confrontation requirements. But forensic analyses by definition
would almost always trigger Confrontation Clause concerns and rightfully
SO.195
187. 557 U.S. at 308.
188. 564 U.S. at 651.
189. 567 U.S. 50 (2012).
190. Id. at 58.
191. Id. at 56.
192. Id. at 58.
193. To be sure, we have argued here that the Confrontation Clause gives defendants other
rights against process-based evidence, but the fact remains that our proposal does not conflict with
the holdings in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams.
194. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) ("When ... the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial
and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause."); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006) ("[Statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.").
195. Note that for process-based evidence, the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause
remain doctrinally separate, just as it is now for witness-based evidence under Crawford. The
hearsay exceptions discussed above for unavailability or for well-known, reliable processes might
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C. Credibility as Reliability
To assess witness-based evidence, factfinders often rely heavily on
witness credibility."' If one believes the witness, then the testimony is
reliable; if not, then it is not. And generally speaking, factfinders are
comfortable making credibility determinations, whether based on demeanor,
cross-examination, or the witness's character for truthfulness."' To be sure,
social science over the last several decades has questioned the accuracy of
such assessments, but most factfmders are at least comfortable and familiar
with making witness credibility determinations.1 98
Assessments of process-based evidence may seem a different matter.
We frequently determine the credibility of a salesperson's pitch, a
colleague's movie or restaurant recommendation, or a friend's excuse for
declining a dinner invitation. We less often assess a process's reliability. In
fact, we normally defer to process-based evidence, giving it a strong
presumption of accuracy. We rarely question whether our electrical bill is
correct, whether the bank correctly deposited our check, or whether a medical
test result is accurate. Much of this deference is rational and efficient. The
advantage of processes is in their uniformity and accuracy. Problems, should
they occur, usually occur in systemic, widespread fashion and will be
discovered by regulators or parties with greater stakes.199 It is not worth our
own personal time to investigate process reliability. We lack the expertise
and access, and we can simply freeride on the efforts of others.
But the courtroom is one context in which we cannot simply presume
accuracy, and factfmders may be bewildered as to how to assess the reliability
of a process. How can we increase jury competence with process-based
evidence? One step is to teach process-assessment principles to attorneys in
law school or through continuing education. Just as nascent trial attorneys
therefore not extend to Confrontation. After all, if Crawford is to be taken seriously, Confrontation
is a procedural right, not just an exercise in ensuring reliable evidence. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence,
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.").
196. See Roth, supra note 20, at 1985 (identifying tools and doctrines designed to provide
factfinders with sufficient information in order to determine a witness's credibility).
197. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe ofthe Hands, a Lick ofthe Lips: The Validity ofDemeanor
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157, 1162-63 (1993); see also Max
Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2578
(2008) (explaining that though juries are not good at analyzing a witness's demeanor, they may be
able to do a better job in some situations).
198. Improving how factfinders handle witness credibility determinations is well beyond the
scope of this Article. We can always hope, however, that improvements in how to handle
process-based reliability determinations will ultimately come around and promote improvements in
how to handle witness-based reliability determinations.
199. E.g., Matt Hamilton, Did DWP Overcharge You? Customers to Receive Info on Billing




learn to master the art of cross-examination, attorneys need to understand the
weaknesses of process-based evidence, know how to use the enhanced
discovery tools to probe those weaknesses, and be proficient at educating
jurors about them at trial.
Second, jurors can receive further help through jury instructions
explaining some simple ways for assessing process-based evidence. We
sketch three basic principles or factors below. The careful observer will
recognize that these factors share a deep kinship with factors used in
assessing scientific reliability under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.2" This kinship should be entirely unsurprising. The power
of science derives from its process-based nature, and so how the legal system
determines reliable scientific experts should mirror how it determines
reliable, process-based evidence.2 01 Daubert of course is an evidentiary rule,
applied by judges to screen or "gatekeep" scientific evidence from the jury,
but the principles are not exclusively useful for gatekeeping. They can also
inform factfinding and the weighing of process-based evidence.2 02
1. Testing.-A reliable process is not only capable of being tested but in
fact has been tested and has known error rates. 2 03 Process-based evidence's
reliability comes from the fact that the underlying process is standardized and
thus produces predictable results not dependent on the subjective perception
or caprice of a person. Since it produces reproducible results, testers can give
it known samples and assess its performance. Indeed, if a process is not
capable of being tested, it is arguably not process-based evidence at all. And
notably, testing not only ensures reliability, but the resulting data on error
rates also help the factfinder assess the probative value of the process-based
evidence. 20
200. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
201. One could conceive of a Daubert-like regime for screening process-based evidence. Id. at
592-95.
202. Although we do not propose one here, one could conceive of a "gatekeeping" scheme for
handling process-based evidence. Courts could justify the more paternalistic scheme using
arguments similar to those for expert evidence: Lay jurors are unfamiliar with assessing processes,
whereas judges could develop greater expertise through repeated exposure. On the other hand, given
the prevalence ofprocess-based evidence, a gatekeeping scheme would significantly alter the power
balance between judge and jury.
203. Testing recalls Daubert's falsiflability and error rate factors. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-
94; Munia Jabbar, Note, Overcoming Daubert's Shortcomings in Criminal Trials: Making the Error
Rate the Primary Factor in Daubert's Validity Inquiry, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2034, 2037 (2010)
("[T]he error rate should be the primary factor in the validity inquiry under Daubert.").
204. Cf Jabbar, supra note 203, at 2054 ("Prioritizing the error rate also maximizes the
probative value of evidence." Jabbar analogizes, "The lower the error rate of a scientific
methodology, the more likely the methodology is accurate, and thus the more likely that it provides




For example, suppose at issue is whether Fragrance A is the same as
Fragrance B. One process that would provide useful evidence on fragrance
similarity might be gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. 205 A machine
analyzes the chemical composition between Fragrances A and B and reaches
a conclusion based on predetermined thresholds. To assess the reliability of
the process, we observe that the accuracy of the machine is capable of being
tested and (in nearly every case) has been calibrated on known test samples
before being used on Fragrances A and B. One could even have the
spectrometer "compare" two A samples and then two B samples as an
additional check, and we might expect an opposing party using enhanced
discovery rights to do exactly that.
The principles work for a human-involved process as well. Suppose
rather than a mass spectrometer, a party offers the results of a professional
perfume tester instead.2 06 The perfume tester receives samples blinded by a
third party and then uses his nose to make the determination. Despite being a
black box, this procedure remains a testable process and potentially a reliable
one if the perfume tester was previously tested using known samples.
Whether the known samples are sufficiently related to the unknown samples
will be a matter for debate, but those are issues for the factfinder to decide. If
the perfume tester simply smelled both A and B and made a determination
without any standards or testing, that would fail the testing factor. That kind
of subjective observation is more appropriately dealt with as witness-based
evidence.
The testing factor works best with diagnostic-type processes, but it also
works with other forms of process-based evidence. Business records, for
example, arise from nondiagnostic processes, yet they are capable of being
tested and having their accuracy rates determined. Bank tellers and clerks can
receive blinded "dummy" transactions, and a third party can then check their
accuracy. More difficult are things like scientific treatises because accuracy
is less straightforwardly defined. In the case of a treatise though, its weakness
on the testing factor is made up for in the second factor, transparency.
2. Transparency. -Reliability often comes from transparency.2 0 7 A
process whose internal workings and outcomes are publicly observed and
subject to criticism will generally be more robust and accurate than one
closely guarded. This preference for transparency extends well beyond the
enhanced discovery rules proposed earlier. Enhanced discovery-access and
205. Charles Cronin, Lost and Found: Intellectual Property of the Fragrance Industry; From
Trade Secret to Trade Dress, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 256, 270 (2015).
206. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 483-84 (discussing a perfume sniffer as an example of
"connoisseur testimony").
207. After all, "[s]unlight is ... the best of disinfectants." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67
(1976) (per curiam) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933)).
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disclosure by the opposing party within the narrow confines of litigation-is
the bare minimum demanded to ensure the workings of the adversarial
system. Yet enhanced discovery alone is far from ideal for ensuring
reliability. By contrast, a process in the public domain is subject to perpetual
access and testing by any interested party, making its weaknesses far more
likely to be known.
To return to the fragrance comparison example: Suppose the mass
spectrometer uses widely accepted techniques and is regularly certified by an
internationally recognized standards organization. Its results are likely to be
more reliable (or at least, less likely to have hidden flaws) than an instrument
internally designed and tested by a private firm. Might the proprietary system
be better? Sure. But trust and reliability come from transparency.
The peer-review factor in the Daubert context is akin to this
transparency factor.2 08 Courts and commentators sometimes treat peer-
review publication itself as a kind of touchstone of reliability, but that is an
oversimplification.2 09 Instead, it is the entire process that matters. Top
journals have rigorous peer review in part to protect their reputation and in
part due to the stiff competition for publication slots. That peer review creates
transparency, and as referees ask hard questions, weaknesses come to light.
After publication, because top journals have wide readership, other experts
will both read the article and respond with criticisms and potential concerns.
It is the whole process that creates transparency and ensures quality.
3. Objective Standards.-The third factor, the presence of objective
standards, is a key enabler of testing and transparency. Indeed, one might
even argue that the presence of at least some objective standard is necessary
for there to be a process at all. A "process" that produces subjective and vague
determinations lacks objective standards and is both nontransparent and
almost impossible to test. Take, for example, a fragrance tester who merely
reports smelling apples with hints of raspberry. That tester provides witness-
based, not process-based, evidence.
Objectivity is of course a matter of degree. It will vary from process to
process and will affect the probative force of the process-based evidence as
measured on a continuum. Mass spectrometry involves objective standards
throughout. The blinded fragrance expert faces some objective testing
standards but otherwise is a black box.
208. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
209. See id. ("[Slubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good




On a final note, none of these factors-testing, transparency,
objectivity-are absolutely required for a process to be sufficiently reliable
for consideration. But this multifactored inquiry is no different than in the
case of assessing witness credibility. A witness's consistency, lack of
defensiveness, and reputation for truthfulness may all contribute to a jury's
decision to believe his testimony, but no one factor is always dispositive. The
key point is that tools exist for evaluating the relative strength of process-
based evidence, and factfinders can use them.
D. Examples
This Part has proposed some significant reforms to the rules of evidence
to accommodate the rise of process-based evidence. Instead of witness
appearance and cross-examination, we have proposed enhanced discovery.
Relatedly, we have refocused the hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause
away from witness appearance and toward more meaningful mechanisms for
ensuring reliability and confrontation. Finally, we reframed credibility so that
factfinders probe the accuracy, transparency, and objectivity of the
underlying process, rather than focusing on the credibility of witness
surrogates.
It bears re-emphasizing that the strength of our process-based evidence
regime is in its conceptual shift. Under our proposal, process-based evidence
comes out from under the shadow of witnesses. Process-based evidence is no
longer hindered by rules primarily concerned about witness reliability and
instead is scrutinized on its own terms. Consider the following four examples
in which distinguishing processes from witnesses will rationalize evidence
law.
1. Forensic Results.-Perhaps the most dramatic impact of a process
view will be on forensics. Currently, the Confrontation Clause requires the
appearance of an analyst in court to present forensic evidence-no matter
how reliable or unreliable the underlying process. This requirement is highly
inefficient.210 Defendants receive minimal benefits, as the analyst is unlikely
to remember any specific sample. At the same time, the costs to the system
are substantial. With labs already struggling to meet even a fraction of
demand,211 asking analysts to spend their days in court to provide
meaningless testimony makes little sense.2 12
210. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 341 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that Melendez-Diaz "imposes enormous costs on the administration of justice").
211. James M. Anderson et al., The Unrealized Promise of Forensic Science: An Empirical
Study of its Production and Use 2 (RAND Corp., Working Paper No. 1242, 2018)
https://www.rand.org/pubs/working-papers/WR1242.html [https://perma.ccIU9VQ-5B7F].
212. Some recent scholarship has suggested that courts and forensic labs have adjusted to make
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Under a process-based regime, these awkward practices are eliminated
in favor of more appropriate safeguards. The right to enhanced discovery
gives defendants direct access and the opportunity to challenge the process
that led to inculpatory evidence. No longer will defendants engage in fruitless
cross-examinations of individual technicians; instead, defendants can
challenge just how accurate the machines and processes really are.
The process-based regime also incentivizes good forensic lab practices
and encourages compliance with the well-known recommendations of the
National Research Council (NRC).213 The NRC's report on forensic reform
in 2008 emphasized the need for blinding samples;2 14 performing proficiency
testing; standardizing accreditation; "assessing the development and
introduction of new technologies in forensic investigations";2 15
"standard[izing] terminology"; 2 16 funding research to address issues of
"accuracy, reliability, and validity";2 17 and furthering research on "human
observer bias and sources of human error in forensic examinations." 2 18
These attributes are precisely the ones that the process-based evidence
regime promotes. If a lab has all of these attributes, enhanced discovery is
practically simple. The standardized procedures, objective standards, and
testing results are already transparent and publicly available. And because
the forensic analyses are in fact the result of a process, there is no need for
individual analysts to appear in court-a far more efficient state of affairs.
At the same time, the proposed regime penalizes bad forensic practices.
The NRC reserved its harshest criticism for analyses that neglected blinding,
lacked objective standards, and were dependent on subjective determinations
in-person testimony feasible so that early admonitions of a system collapse have not come true. See
Edward K. Cheng, Catherine Bonventre, The Impact of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, EXCITED
UTTERANCE: THE EVIDENCE & PROOF PODCAST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www
.excitedutterancepodcast.com/listen/2018/3/19/48-catherine-bonventre [https://perma.cc/CS6H-
LY55] (noting strategies that laboratories have developed in response to Melendez-Diaz's in-person
testimony requirement). Even so, technician time could be far better spent, and as we argue, there
are better ways to assure reliable forensic evidence.
213. Although the NRC report was released with great fanfare in 2008 and is widely regarded
as having made sound recommendations for reform, most observers have acknowledged that it has
had little practical effect thus far. George C. Thomas IHl, Blinded by the Light: A Review of Mark
Godsey 's Blind Injustice, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 597, 608 (2018); see also State v. Davidson, 509
S.W.3d 156, 211-12 (Tenn. 2016) (collecting cases and expressly rejecting the NRC report's
findings as it relates to fingerprint evidence in Tennessee courts), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 105 (2017).
214. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 124 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/228091.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9JS-QKPJ].
215. Id. at 19-20.
216. Id. at 189.
217. Id. at 190.
218. Id. at 191.
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by analysts.2 19 This kind of forensic analysis is emphatically not process-
based; it is witness-based. It therefore should not benefit from the streamlined
treatment proposed above and instead should face the current Confrontation
Clause strictures requiring the analyst to appear and testify.
Ultimately for forensics, the true power of the process-based regime
may again come from the shift in perspective. If the process-based procedure
becomes the standard by which (good) forensics are admitted in criminal
cases, then subjective forensic analyses admitted under witness-based rules
will become the aberration. And as an aberration, perhaps judges will treat
bad forensics more skeptically, perhaps excluding the worst cases under
Daubert.
2. Scientific Articles.-As discussed in subpart III(B), the learned
treatise exception is structurally odd. The exception focuses on the witness,
the conduit for the treatise, rather than the treatise itself. Treatises are hearsay
but qualify for the exception if "relied on by [an] expert" and the expert
"establishe[s] [the treatise] as a reliable authority."2 20 And the treatise must
"be read into evidence, .. . not received as an exhibit." 22 ' Better would be a
framework that focused on the treatise and dispensed with the witness
conduits.
The proposed regime handles treatises far more cleanly as process-based
evidence. Our confidence in the reliability of a journal article or treatise
comes not only from the reputation of the author but also from the publication
process, which involves peer review and public disclosure. Since information
on the publication process is readily obtainable (and in some cases, judicially
noticeable), scientific articles and treatises are easily admissible. A jury can
then assess the evidentiary weight of a treatise by considering the reliability
of the publication process. Note that under a process-based evidence regime,
no experts are needed to introduce treatises in evidence. The reliability of
treatises comes from their origins, not some expert witness who vouches for
it.222 Parties should be able to contest the reliability of the publication process
and the treatise itself on the basis of documents alone.
219. Id. at 8.
220. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
221. Id.
222. Note that the vouching expert does not need to be the author under the learned treatise
exception and indeed will be someone hired by the party. Bernstein, supra note 82, at 454-55 ("The
problem of conscious bias arises when 'hired guns' adapt their opinions to the needs of the attorney
who hires them."). At least on direct examination, the expert merely has to rely on the proposition
cited and vouch for the treatise's acceptance in the field. One gets the impression that the witness-




This simplified method for introducing scientific information promotes
efficiency and lowers economic barriers for indigent parties by reducing the
need for expert witnesses. For example, Jennifer Mnookin has proposed
expanding the use of "modular expert evidence," in which groups of experts
develop standardized, premade modules to educate jurors on topics like the
reliability of eyewitness identification, how to interpret DNA evidence, and
the like.2 23 Under our current evidentiary system, a significant obstacle to
modular expert evidence is the hearsay rule (and the requirements of the
learned treatise exception). The process-based regime, by contrast, allows
modules to go straight to the factfinder, presuming that they were developed
using sufficiently reliable processes.
3. Photographs.-The proposed regime coheres with the current two-
path system for admitting photographs, except that it appropriately flips the
script. Recall that, at present, the legal system prefers treating photographs
as demonstrative evidence, since the evidence comes from the in-court
witness, and the photograph is merely an accompanying demonstrative aid.224
Admission along this path is relatively simple, but using photographs as
demonstrative evidence is pure fiction. The power of the photograph is not in
illustrating the witness's testimony but rather in its more objective, process-
based perspective.22 5 By contrast, a current regime skeptically treats the silent
witness theory almost as a second-best. 226 Our proposed regime does not. It
handles recorded images on their own terms, which is indeed as a silent
(process-based) "witness."
Under a process-based regime, special rules can simplify the admission
process for standard photographs or videos, such as those from cameras,
video recorders, and phones. Those rules obviate the need for enhanced
discovery, except when specific circumstances suggest untrustworthiness.2 27
For other types of video evidence, the process-based framework would
handle images more carefully than the existing demonstrative regime. For
example, a computer-generated accident reconstruction would require
223. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Repeat Play Evidence: Jack Weinstein, "Pedagogical Devices,"
Technology, and Evidence, 64 DEPAUL L. REv. 571, 589-95 (2015).
224. FED. R. EvID. 1002; Mnookin, supra note 7, at 67.
225. See Jordan S. Gruber et al., Video Technology, 58 AM. JUR. TRIALS 481, 502 (1996) ("In
addition to beingpervasive, video technology and television is extremely persuasive." (emphasis in
original)).
226. E.g., United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing the
"'silent witness' model, under which the admissibility of a photograph is based on the reliability of
the process by which it is made" is applicable only "where obviously no witness has viewed the
scene portrayed").
227. Cf FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
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enhanced discovery of the software and procedures used for constructing the
animation.228 (Some form of Rule 403 might apply as well.)
Concededly, because process- and witness-based rules would operate
concurrently, nothing formally prevents parties from continuing to introduce
photographs as demonstrative evidence. But over time, we expect a cultural
shift. Visual evidence with high evidentiary value will tend to be process-
based and admitted through streamlined process-based evidentiary
exceptions. The demonstrative evidence mechanism would slowly become
the exception, and courts will treat it with greater skepticism.229
4. Business Records.-As discussed in subpart III(D), Rule 803(6), the
business records exception, is one of the few areas in which traditional
evidence law properly acknowledges the reliability of process-based
evidence. The current evidentiary regime, however, still gets a few things
wrong: First, Rule 803(6) is a hearsay exception, so the burden is on the
proponent to prove its elements.230 Second, until recently in federal courts
and still in some jurisdictions, Rule 803(6) requires an in-court custodian,
another example of the traditional regime relying on witness surrogates.2 31
Third, the exception arguably goes too far. True, business records should not
be barred by the hearsay rule, but they should not receive a free pass. 2 32 An
opponent may want a meaningful opportunity to challenge the reliability of
the process that created the record.
The proposed process-based framework handles business records
appropriately. As process-based evidence, they are not excludable as
conventional hearsay nor do they require an exception like Rule 803(6). At
the same time, business records are not given a free pass. Proponents must
provide enhanced discovery of the business record process to their
opponents, with exceptions made only for special circumstances and under
certain conditions.
228. Thus tying in our proposal above. See supra subpart IV(A).
229. NEAL FEIGENSON, EXPERIENCING OTHER MINDS IN THE COURTROOM 2-3 (2016)
(discussing concerns about visual evidence that does nothing but advocate for the party's subjective
narrative).
230. FED. R. EVID. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on 2014 Amendments.
231. Compare FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (allowing a certification that "complies with Rule 902(11)
or (12)" in the alternative to a live witness's testimony), and FED. R. EvID. 902 Notes of Advisory
Committee on 2017 Amendments (clarifying why the amendment allows for authentication of
"certain electronic evidence" without a foundation witness: "As with the provisions on business
records in Rules 902(11) and (12), the Committee has found that the expense and inconvenience of
producing a witness to authenticate an item of electronic evidence is often unnecessary"), with CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1271 (West 2015) (business records exception not requiring a custodian), and N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-08-01 (LexisNexis 2010) (same).
232. Arguably, the one exception to this "free pass" is the limitation in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 111-12 (1943), which eliminates the business records exception for records produced in
anticipation of litigation or under abnormal circumstances.
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V. Conclusion: A Process-Based Revolution?
Although the evidentiary reforms we propose in this Article may seem
somewhat radical at first, we believe that they are largely evolutionary. The
witness-based paradigm developed and became entrenched in a world in
which evidence came from people. With the rise of processes and process-
based evidence, the time has come for evidence law to evolve to meet the
new context. The legal system ought not fetishize the witness. It should
demand witnesses only when they are the actual source of evidence, and it
should recognize processes as the independent evidence-generating sources
they are.
Our proposed reforms do nothing more than this. They distinguish
witness-based from process-based evidence. They eliminate the awkward
legal constructs that result when the law demands witnesses for everything:
photographs as demonstrative evidence, the learned treatise exception,
custodians for business records, forensic evidence tagged to a specific
analyst, among others. Instead, our reforms scrutinize process-based
evidence on its own terms, giving opponents access to the underlying
processes and examining the processes' accuracy, transparency, and
objectivity.
Though we propose significant changes for process-based evidence, the
world of witnesses remains intact. The parties remain free to introduce
witnesses, cross-examine them, and challenge their character for truthfulness.
All we have proposed is that process-based evidence not be treated like
witness-based evidence and that the legal system not exhibit a preference for
the latter.
But we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the potentially
revolutionary implications of our proposal. Heretofore, process-based
evidence has been effectively suppressed by the existing witness-based
framework, giving it no room to expand in influence. Our proposal lets the
genie out of the bottle. If fully implemented, process-based evidence will
compete with witness-based evidence on an even playing field, and in a fair
fight, the legal system may start shifting dramatically in the process-based
direction. After all, the rest of the world has shifted from people to processes.
Why shouldn't the legal system?
We can take this argument one step further. Suppose we were tasked
with designing an evidentiary system from scratch, without the shackles of
tradition. On one hand, there is process-based evidence, which emphasizes
objectivity, testability, and documentation. On the other hand, there is
witness-based evidence, which social science has repeatedly demonstrated to
be fallible in ways not readily detected by factfinders.2 33 Why should the legal
233. Blumenthal, supra note 197, at 1160-63; Minzner, supra note 197, at 2565-71.
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system treat both equally? Should not the evidentiary preference indeed be
the opposite of what it is now? Rather than preferring witnesses, the legal
system should prefer processes, and only where process-based evidence is
unavailable should courts settle for in-person testimony.2 34 If a photograph or
video captures a crime in progress, the legal system should prefer that
process-based evidence over a witness.23 5 Unless a witness can attest to some
factor not captured by the photograph or video, any overlapping testimony
by the witness should be excluded. The reliability of the video should trump
the subjectivity and fallibility of the witness. To be sure, such a radical
departure from current practice has its dangers, but the discussion is worth
having.
Whether process-based evidence is an equal partner or becomes a
preferred medium, the resulting cultural shift may have profound
implications for the legal system. For example, will broader acceptance of
process-based evidence shift us away from a system based on oral testimony
and toward a documentary system favored in civil law countries? After all,
processes and process-based evidence are creatures of documents. How will
a shift toward documents and away from oral testimony impact the narrative
nature of American trials? Will it lead jurors to view evidence more
atomistically and more in line with Bayesian models of proof, instead of
today's holistic, story-based models?236 What effect will that shift have on
the moral force of judicial pronouncements?
Consider another philosophical implication. Processes in many ways
represent the triumph of systems over individuals. They embody a belief that
careful algorithmic reasoning produces better and more reliable results than
the intuitive judgments of individual artisans. And once one proves a system
reliable, there is no need to revisit that question-unlike in the case of a
witness or expert, who changes on a case-by-case basis. Will broader
acceptance of process-based evidence lead the legal system to de-emphasize
individualized justice in favor of system-wide efficiency and accuracy? Will
it spawn broader issue-preclusion doctrines and precedent? What do we as a
society gain and lose from such a shift?
Perhaps both changes-toward a documentary system and a systems
approach-have practically occurred already. The prevalence of settlement
234. For a discussion of the emergence of the witness preference, see Fisher, supra note 1, at
602-24.
235. Such an occurrence would reverse the phenomena discussed by Professor Mnookin.
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 54.
236. See Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27
LAW & PHIL. 223, 228-32 (2008) (explaining the "inference to the best explanation" model); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision
Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189-90 (1992) (explaining the "Story Model");
Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece of
Evidence: A Proposalfor Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS 43, 44,48-51 (2007) (taking, in part, a Bayesian
approach to forensic evidence).
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and motions practice (and the death of trials) in modem litigation suggest that
the modem legal system is already comfortable dispensing with
individualized justice and oral testimony. The only remaining relic is the trial,
which still champions the person over the process.
In any event, it is time for the evidentiary rules to make the leap into the
process-based world of the twenty-first century. Let us recognize and handle
process-based evidence for what it is, and let the chips fall where they will.
